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IMPLIED INDEMNITY:
A POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE TOTAL LOSS SHIFTING
REMEDY IN A PARTIAL LOSS SHIFTING JURISDICTION
VINCENT S. WALKO wIAK*
INTRODUCTION

Every radical change in the body of substantive law is inevitably followed
by a complementary residual modification of procedural rules and substantive
law to accommodate that change and resolve the interstitial details between the
existing law and the change. Some changes, however, are so fundamental that
the accommodations are as substantial as the initial change itself. When the
Florida supreme court adopted pure comparative negligence in Hoffman v.
Jones' in 1973, it was the first court to do so in the twentieth century. New life
was breathed into legal development through use of common law. The effects
on the negligence law of Florida were immediate and probably long lasting.
Contributory negligence was abandoned as an absolute defense;2 "last clear
chance" was totally abrogated;3 and the continued existence of the doctrine of
*B.A., 1968; J.D., 1971, University of Illinois; Associate Professor of Law, Southern
Methodist University.
1. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973). While Florida is not the only state to
have adopted pure comparative negligence by court decision, having been followed by California, Nga Li, v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 199 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975) and
Alaska, Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alas. 1975), it was the pioneer jurisdiction and did so
even though the state lacked a comprehensive system of post-judgment loss distribution. It is
appropriate, therefore, to concentrate on Florida, the modern pioneer in the common law
development of interpersonal rights.
2. Comparative negligence in both its pure and modified form permits the defendant to
assert the affirmative defense of contributory negligence, but it is no longer an absolute defense to the plaintiff's claim. Under pure comparative negligence, the plaintiff's damages are
reduced by the proportion that his negligence bears to the total negligence involved. As the
Hoffman court stated in describing the typical two party action: "If it appears from the
evidence that both plaintiff and defendant were guilty of negligence which was, in some degree, a legal cause of the injury to the plaintiff, this does not defeat the plaintiff's recovery
entirely. The jury in assessing damages would in that event award to the plaintiff such
damages as in the jury's judgment the negligence of the defendant caused to the plaintiff."
280 So. 2d at 438. See also Gutierrez v. Murdock, 300 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1974). The
California Supreme Court in adopting the same doctrine expressed the rule as follows: "[I]n
all actions for negligence resulting in injury to person or property, the contributory negligence of the person injured in person or property shall not bar recovery, but the damages
awarded shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the
person recovering." Nga Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 829, 532 P.2d 1226, 1243, 119
Cal. Rptr. 858, 875 (1975).
3. 280 So. 2d at 438.
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assumption of the risk as an absolute defense was seriously questioned.4 The
Hoffman decision was rendered at a time when Florida had no comprehensive
system of post-judgment loss distribution. Florida is, therefore, a state in which
judicial and legislative action has proceeded through the subsequent stages of
developing such a system. These are stages that may have been barely contemplated at the time of Hoffman. Consequently, other jurisdictions may be
helped by understanding the spectrum of developmental alternatives considered by this state.
Pure comparative negligence involves a comparison of the degrees of fault
of the claimant and defendant, permitting the claimant 5 to recover a judgment
reduced by the percentage ratio of his negligence to the total causative negligence." Thus it became apparent that the Florida loss allocation system, which
prohibited contribution among joint tortfeasors, could not long survive.7 Prior
to Hoffman, the rule prohibiting contribution was consistently attacked,8 but
4. Three Florida district courts of appeal abrogated the defense of assumption of risk as
an absolute defense. Hall v. Holton, 330 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1976); Parker v. Maule, 321
So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1975); Rea v. Leadership Housing, Inc., 312 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 4th
D.C.A. 1975). See also Nga Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 829, 532 P.2d 1226, 1243, 119
Cal. Rptr. 858, 875 (1975). One Florida district court of appeal decided, however, that the
doctrine was not totally subsumed into pure comparative negligence. Dorta v. Blackburn, 302
So. 2d 450 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1974). The issue, therefore, was not completely without doubt until
it was resolved by the supreme court in Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977), the
consolidated appeal of Dorta v. Blackburn, supra, Rea v. Leadership Housing Inc., supra, and
Parker v. Maule, supra, in which the court held that the defense of assumption of risk is no
longer an absolute defense but is merged into the doctrine of comparative negligence.
5. It is conceptually much easier to think of the injured party seeking damages in the
pure comparative negligence action as a "claimant" rather than to utilize the more traditional plaintiff-defendant dichotomy. In the pure comparative negligence action every injured party may seek compensation for his damages from the causally negligent other parties.
These damages are reduced, however, by the claimant's percentage of negligence.
6. Thus in a two party action if one of the parties is injured and both have been
negligent, both parties share in the total loss caused. The claimant shares in the total loss
caused by bearing the burden of his loss which is the reciprocal of his percentage of negligence to all negligence which caused his injury. The defendant shares in the total loss by
remaining financially liable for the amount of the claimant's loss which the claimant has not
been forced to bear. See Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d at 438.
7. Although the Hoffman court refused to abolish this rule, the refusal appeared less a
recognition that the rule was inconsistent with the doctrine of pure comparative negligence
than a reluctance to decide an unripe issue. 280 So. 2d at 439. The reluctance of the district
courts to overrule the rule prohibiting contribution may be found in the Hoffman decision
itself, wherein the supreme court chastened the Fourth District Court of Appeal for overruling long standing precedent in the following manner: "To allow a District Court of Appeal to overrule controlling precedent of this Court would be to create chaos and uncertainty in the judicial forum, particularly at the trial level....
"This is not to say that the District Courts of Appeal are powerless to seek change; they
are free to certify questions of great public interest to this Court for Consideration, and even
to state their reasons for advocating change. They are, however, bound to follow the case law
set forth by this Court." 280 So. 2d at 434. See note 11 infra. After chastising the district
court, the supreme court accepted its decision adopting pure comparative negligence.
8. Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So. 2d 386, 389 (Fla. 1975) is demonstrative of this proposition:
"Initially, we are compelled to elucidate on the questioned continued viability and com-
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adoption of pure comparative negligence gave new impetus to the movement
to abolish the doctrine. Judicial adoption of contribution among joint tortfeasors awaited action by the Florida supreme court. However, while a direct
challenge to the rule prohibiting contribution among joint tortfeasors was
pending before the court, 9 and perhaps in response to that pending challenge,
the Florida Legislature adopted the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors
Act.O In light of this legislative action, the Florida supreme court, in Lincenberg v. Issen,1- took no action regarding its own adoption of contribution
12
among joint tortfeasors.
In 1976, the Florida Legislature abandoned the pro rata contribution
scheme and adopted contribution among tortfeasors based upon degrees of
fault.'3 Both contribution statutes specifically recognized that the adoption of
contribution among tortfeasors did not require the abrogation of the common
law doctrine of implied indemnity.1 4 Thus, while the adoption of the loss
patibility of the principle of no contribution among joint tortfeasors, a doctrine to which the
courts of Florida have been committed in negligence suits although significantly we must note
that various exceptions have been created to alleviate the harshness of this rule." For a brief
bibliography, see Walkowiak, Innocent Injury and Loss Distribution:The Florida Pure Comparative Negligence System, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 66, 99 n.105 (1977).
9. Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1975), rev'g, Issen v. Lincenberg, 293 So. 2d
777 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1974). Lincenberg was briefed and argued in 1974, although the supreme
court did not render a decision until July 20, 1975, after the legislative session had ended.
10. 1975 Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-108, amended by 1976 Fla. Laws, ch. 76-186, codified as
FrA. STAT. §768.31 (1977). See note 13 infra.
11. 318 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1975), rev'g, 293 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1974). The Third
District Court of Appeal's opinion was one of a number of post-Hoffman decisions in which
the Florida intermediate appellate courts refused to abandon the rule which prohibited contribution among tortfeasors. See also Rader v. Variety Children's Hospital, 293 So. 2d 778 (Fla.
3d D.C.A. 1974); Acevedo v. Acosta, 296 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1974); Maybarduk v.
Bustamante, 294 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1974).
12. In Issen, the Florida supreme court frankly acknowledged that the rule prohibiting
contribution among joint tortfeasors was inconsistent with the doctrine of pure comparative
negligence. 318 So. 2d at 391. The trial court had permitted the jury to compute the percentage of negligence of the joint tortfeasors. Since the Florida Legislature had adopted the
pro rata contribution scheme of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act in which
contribution shares are computed regardless of the degrees of fault of the tortfeasors, the
trial court's direction to have the jury compute degrees of fault required the jury to reach
an unnecessary decision. The tortfeasor satisfying more than his pro rata share of liability
was entitled to receive pro rata contribution from all joint tortfeasors regardless of their
relative degrees of fault. Interestingly, the procedure followed by the trial court, while inconsistent with the contribution statute as adopted by the legislature in 1975, anticipated the
amended contribution statute. Under the amended act the percentages of fault of the joint
tortfeasor must be computed, since contribution shares are computed based upon the percentage degrees of fault of the liable parties. See notes 13 and 31 infra.
13. Fla. Laws 1976, ch. 76-186, §1. The amendment to §768.31 of the Florida Statutes
redefined pro rata under the statute. FLA. STAT. §768.31(3)(a) (1975) had read: "In determining the pro rata shares of tortfeasors in the entire liability: (a) their relative degrees of fault
shall not be considered." FLA. STAT. §768.31(3)(a) (1977) now reads: "In determining the pro
rata shares of tortfeasors in the entire liability: (a) their relative degrees of fault shall be the
basis for allocation of liability."
14. FLA. STAT. §768.31(2)(f) (1977): "This act does not impair any right of indemnity
under existing law. Where one tortfeasor is entitled to indemnity from another, the right of
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sharing approach of pure comparative negligence has been regarded as the
logical antecedent to the abrogation of the common law rule prohibiting loss
sharing among joint tortfeasors, 15 it is debatable whether this antecedent also
logically precludes total loss shifting from one joint tortfeasor to another. In
1977, the Florida Legislature passed the Florida Insurance and Tort Reform
Act of 1977.16
Although the concept of implied indemnification has enjoyed a degree of
prominence in the legal literature, discussion of the doctrine has been limited
primarily to a critique of the rules permiting its application.17 It is not the
express purpose of this article to criticize the method by which implied indemnity is applied in Florida or elsewhere. Instead, this article will analyze
the effects the implied indemnification rules will have upon the loss allocation
model presently in existence in Florida and upon the parties subject to application of that model. WAith that goal in mind, implied indemnity, as interpreted by the Florida courts, along with other rules of tort loss distribution,
will be examined and contrasted before analysis of their effects is undertaken.
JOINT TORTFEASOR LIABILITY

When the tortious acts of two or more defendants cause an indivisible injury to the plaintiff, the defendants are joint tortfeasors and as such are jointly
and severally liable for the total consequence of their actions even if they have
not acted in concert."' The rule that permits a plaintiff to join joint tortfeasors
as defendants in the same lawsuit protects the plaintiff by not allowing a joint
tortfeasor to cast liability on an unnamed tortfeasor. The plaintiff, however, is
entitled to collect his judgment in full from any one or any combination of the
liable defendants. The plaintiff may sue joint tortfeasors jointly or severally,
and the tortfeasors sued cannot join additional but unnamed tortfeasors as

the indemnity obligee is for indemnity and not contribution, and the indemnity obligor is not
entitled to contribution from the obligee for any portion of his indemnity obligation."
15. "With emphasis, we restate that this Court in Hoffman announced that when the
negligence of more than one person contributes to the occurrence of an accident, each should
pay the proportion of total damage3 which he has caused the other party. The same rationale
eliminates justification for the no contribution principle and dictates that this rule be
abolished." Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So. 2d 386, 391 (Fla. 1975).
16. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-468 (codified in scattered sections of FLA. STAT. (1977)).
17. See, e.g., Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REv.
130 (1932); O'Donnell, Implied Indemnity in Modern Tort Litigation: The Case for a Public
Policy Analysis, 6 SErON HALL L. REV. 268 (1975); Werner, Contribution and Indemnity in
California, 57 CAL. L. REV. 490 (1969); Comment, The Allocation of Loss Among Joint Tortfeasors, 41 U.S.CAL. L. REV. 728 (1968).
18. The Florida supreme court succinctly stated this rule in Louisville & N.R.R. v. Allen,
65 So. 8, 12 (Fla. 1914): "The rule under which parties become jointly liable as tortfeasors
extends beyond acts or omissions which are designedly co-operative, and beyond any relation
between the wrongdoers. If their acts of negligence, however separate and distinct in themselves, are concurrent in producing the injury, their liability is joint as well as several ....
Each becomes liable because of his neglect of duty, and they are jointly liable for the single
injury, inflicted because the acts or omissions of both have contributed to it." (Quoting
Brown v. Coxe Bros. & Co., 75 F. 689, 690 (C.C.E.D. Wisc. 1896)).
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defendants to the plaintiff's action. 19 Because each tortfeasor is severally liable
for the full amount, it is unnecessary for the plaintiff to sue each and every
joint tortfeasor. It may, in fact, be tactically unwise to do so, as the plaintiff in
Anderson v. Crawford2o discovered. Since joint and several liability is preserved
under pure comparative negligence, Anderson, a 1933 decision by the Florida
supreme court, is of more than historical interest.
In Anderson, the plaintiff sued for personal injury and property damages as
a result of a collision between his automobile and a freight train, naming as
defendants the engineer in charge of the train and the railroad as joint tortfeasors. The negligence attributed to the railroad was that the train was carelessly and negligently operated by the engineer. The plaintiff moved to have
the trials of the two defendants severed, alleging that the standard for establishing the liability of the defendant railroad was different from the standard for
establishing the liability of the defendant engineer. 21 The trial court denied
the motion and this ruling was sustained on appeal by the Florida supreme
court. 22 Having made the decision to seek a judgment from both tortfeasors,
the plaintiff recognized that the trial presented potential obstacles to recovering a judgment from either. In this instance suing both potential tortfeasors
in the same action may have affected the plaintiff's potential recovery because
the standards for liability were different. The plaintiff (or rather his attorney)
was faced with the difficult decision of whether to join as a party a potentially
attractive defendant whose presence would adversely affect his right to recovery.
He made the decision to join both in the same lawsuit and as a result may have
lost the ability to recover from either. This tactical point of joint tortfeasor
liability was not lost on the plaintiff in Pendarvis v. Pfeifer23 when he elected
to sue only one of two potentially liable tortfeasors.
In Pendarvis, the plaintiff, an eight-year-old child, was struck by an automobile when he alighted from his school bus. He sued the school bus driver
for negligence and received judgment for damages. The defendant school bus
19. See, e.g., Colle v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 153 Fla. 258, 14 So. 2d 422 (1943);
Pendarvis v. Pfeifer, 132 Fla. 724, 182 So. 307 (1938); Anderson v. Crawford, 111 Fla. 381, 149
So. 656 (1933).
20.

111 Fla. 381, 149 So. 656 (1933).

21. Many of the Florida tort cases involving railroads are sui generis during this era of
Florida negligence law. At this time, Florida had a comparative negligence statute which applied only to railroad companies. 1887 Fla. Laws, ch. 3744, codified as FA. STAT. §768.06
(1977). The Supreme Court of Florida declared this statute unconstitutional as violative of
the equal protection and due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions in Georgia
S. & F.R.R. v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 175 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1965). Interestingly, while the
Florida supreme court declared the Florida statute unconstitutional, the Georgia supreme
court through a series of interpretive decisions expanded the application of a similar Georgia
statute to all types of negligence cases. The State of Florida had to wait until Hoffman before
the change from contributory negligence to comparative negligence was effected and in a
much more dramatic fashion. The Hoffman court did state, however, that the opinions
rendered under the railroad comparative negligence statute, previously declared unconstitutional, would serve as valuable precedent to guide future decisions regarding pure comparative negligence. 280 So. 2d at 439.
22. 111 Fla. at 383, 149 So. at 657.
23. 132 Fla. 724, 182 So. 507 (1938).
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driver then appealed, alleging that the driver of the other vehicle was at least
partly responsible for the plaintiff's injuries and should also have been sued in
the same action. The Florida supreme court rejected this argument, citing
Anderson v. Crawford.24 It sustained the lower court's finding that the driver
had a duty to the plaintiff and that the driver had breached that duty.25 It was
the plaintiff's option whether to seek judgment against any one or all of the
allegedly negligent tortfeasors, the court found. Since the defendants were
jointly and severally liable, the plaintiff could collect judgment against a joint
tortfeasor fully, without regard to the other joint tortfeasor - even if they had
been joined as party defendants. A defendant named as a tortfeasor in an
action cannot join as a party defendant other alleged joint tortfeasors. A joint
tortfeasor is liable, as the court firmly established, for the total damages found
by the jury to have been caused to the plaintiff by the combined action of all
joint tortfeasors, whether they are named in the action or not. 26 Adoption of
24. 111 Fla. 381, 149 So. 656 (1933).
25. It is worthy of emphasis that both Anderson and Pendarvis represent cases in which
the plaintiff stood a better chance, in the tactical judgment of his attorneys, of receiving
compensation from the tortfeasors by suing them separately. In both cases, the standard by
which the liability of the different defendants would be measured was different. In Anderson,
the absolute defense of contributory negligence was not available to the railroad; in
Pendarvis, the common carrier liability rule of the bus driver set a higher standard of care
for him than the driver of the automobile. A plaintiff should always have an excellent
tactical reason for failing to join all joint tortfeasors in the same action when that is procedurally possible in view of the high risk that the named defendant will be successful in
shifting all blame to the absentee tortfeasor.
26. If the plaintiff had executed on his judgment against the bus driver, it would have
discharged the joint tortfeasor who might also have been liable for the plaintiff's damages.
See Leo Jay Rosen Associates, Inc. v. Schultz, 148 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1963) and
authorities cited therein. A more interesting question arises when the plaintiff, prior to executing his judgment against one tortfeasor, attempts to sue another joint tortfeasor and
thereby receive a larger judgment. This problem came up by way of two unreconciled Florida
decisions. In Weaver v. Stone, 212 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1968) the plaintiffs in an earlier
action sued the employer of the operator of a vehicle and received a judgment for their
damages. The employer tendered the full amount of the judgment to the plaintiffs and they
refused to accept it. The employer then deposited the full amount of the judgment plus
interest and costs in the registry of the court pursuant to FLA. STAT. §55.141 (1977). Plaintiffs
never collected the money from the registry and instead proceeded to sue the operator of the
vehicle. The trial court granted a summary judgment for the defendant in the action, since
the clerk of the court in the action against the employer had noted the judgment as satisfied
following tender by the employer. The plaintiffs appealed the trial court's decision. The
Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court, although it did not expressly con6ider the validity of the satisfaction of the judgment. Its holding was based upon a procedural ground; the proper manner for the plaintiff to impeach this proceeding was by way
of a motion to amend or vacate pursuant to Rule 1.540 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and not collateral attack on a subsequent action. 212 So. 2d at 82 (Cross, J., dissenting).
On similar facts, the court in Gerardi v. Carisle, 232 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1969) expressly declined to follow the dicta in Weaver. It held that the deposit in a court registry
pursuant to statute does not operate as either res judicata or estoppel by judgment. Such
deposits do not preclude the plaintiff from bringing a subsequent action against another party
who would have been jointly and severally liable on the judgment had it been joined in the
same action. Id. at 39. The Gerardi court cited with approval Power v. Baker, 27 F. 396
(C.C.D. Minn. 1886) which held that a plaintiff may sue joint tortfeasors in separate suits,
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pure comparative negligence or contribution among tortfeasors did nothing to
alter this rule.2 7
There was, however, some possibility that the losses caused to a plaintiff
could be distributed among tortfeasors even prior to the adoption of contribution among joint tortfeasors. If the plaintiff has been caused injuries by the
independent acts of two or more parties and those injuries are severable by
cause, each defendant will be liable as a "concurrent" tortfeasor only for the
injury caused by that defendant. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving
breach of duty by the defendants, causation, and injury. The burden of proving that the defendants are "concurrent" tortfeasors is, however, on the defendants. In order to prove that they are "concurrent," and not joint, tortfeasors, the defendants must prove that each defendant's act caused a certain
identifiable portion of the plaintiff's injuries, and that the plaintiff's damages
are capable of division and assignment by cause among the defendants. 28 If a
defendant succeeds in establishing that he is a concurrent tortfeasor, then the
plaintiff may receive individual judgments against each of the defendants for
the amount of damage that each defendant allegedly caused. The plaintiff may
execute each judgment up to the amount of each concurrent tortfeasor's several
liability.29 If any concurrent tortfeasor is judgment-proof, the burden of loss
"and if separate judgments are obtained, he may make his election to take the larger judgment or pursue the solvent party .... Id. at 397.
Since each joint tortfeasor is jointly and severally liable, the plaintiff could collect a
judgment entered against multiple tortfeasors in any combination or manner he wished up to
the total amount of the judgment. In the absence of any form of post-judgment loss allocation, the parties defendant have little basis to argue prejudice (except for tactical trial considerations) when the plaintiff elects to proceed against them in individual suits. Italso seems
unrealistic in the absence of compelling circumstances to expect that the plaintiff's decision
to execute a judgment against defendants jointly and severally liable will be dictated by any
other motive than efficiency. The judgment will be executed against the solvent defendant
with the most liquid assets. In terms of victim compensation, this represents the most effective
means of assuring that the victim will be compensated in the full amount of his judgment as
efficaciously as possible. Post execution loss allocation is left to the tortfeasors. That being the
case, the potentially liable joint tortfeasors should, in the interest of judicial economy, have
the power to insure that an adjustment of their ultimate liability be effected without the
necessity of subsequent litigation. This is accomplished under the Florida contribution statute
by permitting the joint tortfeasor to bring a third party action against the joint tortfeasor.
FLA. STAT. §768.31(4)(b) (1977). A joint tortfeasor entitled to indemnity may also enforce his
claim by bringing a third party action pursuant to Rule 1.180 of the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure. See, e.g., General Dynamics Corp. v. Adams, 340 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1965) (applying Florida law); Mins Crane Service, Inc. v. Insley Mfg. Corp., 226 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 2d
D.C.A. 1969).
By bringing a third party action asserting the right to contribution or indemnity, the
defendant-third party plaintiff does not join the third party defendant as a party defendant
to the plaintiff's action. Nevertheless, once the third party defendant is joined in suit in this
manner it will have the effect of forcing the plaintiff to join the third party defendant as a
party-defendant in the principal action. See Stuart v. Hertz Corp., 351 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1977).
27. See note 30 infra.
28. Hamblen, Inc. v. Owens, 127 Fla. 91, 172 So. 694 (1937); Wise v. Carter, 119 So. 2d 40
Fla. 1st D.CA. 1960).
29. Thus, if a plaintiff is caused total compensable damages of $1,000 through the "concurrent" negligence of two tortfeasors, the plaintiff will receive separate judgments against
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for the damage that that tortfeasor caused falls upon the plaintiff.30 If the tortfeasors fail to sustain their burden of proof that they are concurrent tortfeasors
the plaintiff receives judgment against them as joint tortfeasors.
Just as the adoption of pure comparative negligence did not directly affect
a joint tortfeasor's liability, it did not directly affect a concurrent tortfeasor's
liability to the plaintiff, nor did the contribution statute alter liability to the
plaintiff of either joint or concurrent tortfeasors. Prior to the adoption of the
contribution among joint tortfeasors statute, the plaintiff could collect his
entire judgment against any tortfeasor, and unless that tortfeasor was entitled
to seek indemnity he could not shift any portion of his loss to a joint tortfeasor. The burden of loss for a judgment-proof joint tortfeasor fell upon the
other tortfeasors from whom the claimant had collected his judgment. Under a
contribution statute such as that adopted by the Florida Legislature, the plaintiff still retains the right to collect his entire judgment from any liable joint
tortfeasor, but that tortfeasor is then entitled to proceed against his co-tortfeasors and seek shares of contribution of the common liability from them.31
the two tortfeasors. Each judgment represents the amount of the injury caused to the plaintiff by that particular tortfeasor. Plaintiff might receive a judgment of $600 from tortfeasor
A and a judgment of $400 from tortfeasor B. Plaintiff must then endeavor to collect $600
from A and $400 from B in order to receive his total compensable recovery. Neither tortfeasor
is liable for the amount of separable damages caused by the other. See generally, Note, Consequences of Proceeding Separately Against Concurrent Tortfeasors, 68 HARV. L. REv. 697
(1955).
30. If all defendants have been sued and are fiscally responsible for their tortious conduct, the distinction between several liability under apportionment and joint and several
liability effects only a minor inconvenience upon the plaintiff as he proceeds to execute his
judgment(s). If, however, under apportionment a particular defendant is judgment proof due
to an immunity or is fiscally irresponsible, then the plaintiff must bear the burden of loss for
that individual's fault-caused injuries. Whether the jurisdiction follows the rule formerly
followed in Florida that contributiory negligence is an absolute defense, or follows some rule
of comparative negligence, the claimant is entitled to collect only for personally innocent
injuries. Under a contributory negligence scheme, the jury must find that the plaintiff was
personally innocent of all causal negligence before he is entitled to recover. Under a rule of
comparative negligence a claimant is entitled only to that portion of those injuries which is
caused by another party-that is, his total injuries are reduced by their percentage of
negligence (which the author calls the "self-responsibility discount"). Thus, under either the
contributory negligence rule or a comparative negligence rule only "personally innocent"
damages are compensable. Prior to the adoption of a contribution statute, joint and several
liability could work a hardship upon a tortfeasor by subjecting him to total liability for
injuries caused through the tortious conduct of multiple parties. The plaintiff, through his
attorney, could be expected to execute his judgment in the most efficacious manner rather
than attempt to accomplish "rough" justice. This desire for efficiency might not necessarily
comply with percentage degrees of fault attributed to the liable tortfeasors. The claimant is
not required to attempt to "apportion" the execution of his joint and several judgment. Thus
even though all tortfeasors might be fiscally able to contribute to the payment of the judgment only one might be subject to execution of the plaintiff's judgment against all. In the
absence of a rule permitting contribution among joint tortfeasors, all liable for their own
conduct, the tortfeasor from whom the claimant collected his judgment could not normally
transfer any portion of those losses to the co-tortfeasors.
31. At this point, the distinction between the contribution shares under 1975 Fla. Laws,
ch. 75-108 ("Pro Rata" contribution) under which Florida operated for one year, and the
contribution shares under FLA. STAr. §768.31 (1977) in its present form (proportional con-
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The burden of loss for the amount that an insolvent tortfeasor must contribute
to the common liability still falls upon the defendant who has satisfied the
judgment, but contribution permits the solvent tortfeasors to share the common
32
liability.
CONTRIBUTION V. INDEMNITY

Contribution among joint tortfeasors does not alter the principle that the
burden of loss for a judgment-proof joint tortfeasor falls initially upon the
tortfeasor from whom the judgment was collected. The plaintiff may still
execute his judgment against any one of the joint tortfeasors found jointly and
severally liable. 33 If the claimant collects more than a particular tortfeasor's
share of the common liability,34 the tortfeasor has a right to seek contribution
tribution) should be drawn. See note 13 supra. Under either form, the tortfeasors are jointly
and severally liable for the total injuries caused.
Under "pro rata" contribution, the tortfeasor paying more than his pro rata share is
entitled to seek contribution from the other joint tortfeasors. The pro rata shares are determined by requiring each party to contribute based upon the ratio of the number of tortfeasors found liable for the injury. Thus, if three tortfeasors were liable, the tortfeasor required to compensate the claimant in full would be entitled to contribution of one third of
the judgment from each of his joint tortfeasors.
Under proportional contribution, the tortfeasor paying more than his proportional share
is entitled to seek contribution from the other joint tortfeasors. The proportional shares are
determined by requiring each party to contribute based upon his percentage of fault as computed by the jury. Thus, if three tortfeasors were found liable, the jury would be asked to
compute their relative percentages of fault. Assuming the claimant were fault free, the jury
might find tortfeasor A was 70 percent negligent, tortfeasor B was 20 percent negligent and
tortfeasor C was 10 percent negligent. If tortfeasor C were the most liquid, the claimant
might be expected to collect his entire judgment from him, in which case C could seek 70
percent of what he was required to pay the claimant from A and 20 percent of what he was
required to pay the claimant from B.
Under neither statute can a tortfeasor expect to receive contribution from his co-tortfeasors
until he has paid more than his share of liability to the claimant. See FLA. STAT. §768.31(2)(b)
(1977). Thus, if the claimant executes judgment against only one tortfeasor and collects the
percentage share or less of that tortfeasor's liability to the claimant, the tortfeasor has no
contribution right against his co-tortfeasors.
32. Under either the pro rata or proportional contribution statutes the tortfeasor who
initially bears the loss is permitted to collect aliquot shares from the other joint tortfeasors.
FLA. STAT. §768.31(2)(b) (1977). Thus, if one of the three joint tortfeasors is insolvent, the
tortfeasor initially bearing the entire loss ends up bearing the loss for the contribution share
of the insolvent tortfeasor. For example, if under the proportional contribution example
given in note 31 supra, tortfeasor A were insolvent, tortfeasor C would still be entitled to
collect only 20 percent of the judgment from tortfeasor B. FLA. STAT. §768.31(2)(b) (1977). See
note 34 infra. By comparison, a Texas contribution statute of application in non-negligence
based actions contains the provision that all solvent tortfeasors bear a proportion of the loss
caused by an insolvent tortfeasor. TEx. Civ. STAT. art. 2212 (1971) superceded in negligence
actions by Tax. Civ. STAT. art. 2212(a) (1976).
33. Although the right to receive contribution does not accrue until one party has paid
more than his "pro rata" share of the common liability, FLA. STAT. §768.31(2)(b) (1977), this
does not impair that party's ability to have his right to contribution determined in the
principal suit. See note 26 supra.
34. "No tortfeasor is compelled to make contribution beyond his own pro rata share of
the entire liability." FLA. STAT. §768.31(2)(b) (1977).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1978

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [1978], Art. 1

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXX

from his co-tortfeasors up to their share of the common liability. Contribution
thus can be understood as a right of a tortfeasor who has been forced to pay3s
more than his share of a correaon liability to force his co-tortfeasors to pay a
share of the common liability. 36 As noted earlier, the antecedent to establishing that multiple tortfeasors are concurrent and not joint tortfeasors is proof
that each tortfeasor has caused separate damage to the plaintiff. There is, therefore, no common liability of concurrent tortfeasors.
Indemnity, 3 7 whether contractual or implied, is the right of a tortfeasor who
has been forced to pay a common liability to force another tortfeasor to compensate him for the entire amount that he has been forced to pay. Unlike contribution, which is loss sharing among tortfeasors, indemnity is a mechanism
for the shifting of loss from one tortfeasor to another. The right to indemnification may be based upon a contract between the tortfeasors 3s or may be a
35. Although a tortfeasor who has settled with a claimant may have the right to receive
contribution from a co-tortfeasor with whom he shared a common liability, there does not
appear to be any significant distinction between this settlement and execution of a judgment
by a claimant against one of multiple tortfeasors since an element of "duress" is present in
both instances. Collusive settlements are handled by permitting the settling tortfeasor to
recover only the reasonable amount of a settlement. FLA. STAT. §768.31(2)(d) (1977).
36. As has been noted, the means by which these "shares" are determined is subject to
multiple interpretation and the contribution statute itself anticipates some cumulation of the
collective liability of a group to be treated as a single share. FLA. STAT. §768.31(3)(b) (1977).
For example, the court in Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So. 2d 386, 393 (Fla. 1975) quoted with
approval the following language from the official comment to §2 of the Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act: "[Class liability, including the common liability arising from vicarious relationships is to be treated as a single share. For instance the liability of a master and
servant for the wrong of the servant should in fairness be treated as a single share. Other
examples are those situations involving co-owners of property, members of an unincorporated
association, those engaged in a joint enterprise and the like; where the problem is the allocation of liability between such a group on the one hand and a tortfeasor having no connection
with the group. It adopts the equitable principle involved in the case of Wold v. Grozalsky,
277 N.W. [N.Y.] 364, 14 N.E.2d 437 (1938), where the plaintiff was injured by the collapse of
a party wall between two buildings. One building was owned by A, the other jointly by B
and C. It was held that B and C were liable each for only one-fourth of the entire liability,
rather than one-third. Another case is Walsh v. Phillips, New York Supreme Court, Niagara
County, July 3, 1952, where one contributor was an unincorporated association, and its
numerous members were held liable in the aggregate only for a single share." See also VTN
Consol. v. Coastal Engineering Assoc., 341 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1976).
37. Although a major portion of this article involves formulating a functional working
definition of indemnity, the RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION offers a viable although ambiguous

general rule: "A person who, in whole or in part, has discharged a duty which is owed by
him but which as between himself and another should have been discharged by the other, is
entitled to indemnity from the other, unless the payor is barred by the wrongful nature of
his conduct." RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §76 (1937).

38. The most common types of contractual indemnification are liability insurance
policies, and "hold harmless clauses" in contracts. Although a complete discussion of contractual indemnification is not within the scope of this article, it is important to note that the
Florida courts have consistently required that such contractual provisions be specific in their
terms. These provisions have been enforced in order to give effect to the intent of the parties
so long as that intent is not contrary to public policy. See, e.g., University Plaza Shopping
Center, Inc. v. Stuart, 272 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 1973); Ivey Plants, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 282 So. 2d
205 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1973).
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right specifically provided for by statute, 9 but the main focus of this discussion
will be upon the implied right to indemnity as interpreted by the Florida
courts 4 0

The Florida statute that created the right to contribution specifies the
method of its enforcement. 41 The description and enforcement of the right to
implied indemnity, however, has been set forth, in common law tradition, in
the judicial opinions that created it. Unlike contribution, which is a sharing
of a common liability, the right of a person seeking indemnity is the right to
receive full compensation for all damages he has suffered as a result of the
actions which form the basis for his claim to indemnity. These damages indude attorney's fees expended by the indemnitee in defending against liability
to the plaintiff, and necessary attorney's fees expended to collect indemnity
from the indemnitor, a form of recovery not granted to the tortfeasor seeking
contribution. 42 The underlying theoretical basis for the right to implied indemnity is different from, and inconsistent with, the right to contribution, and
therefore the enforcement and the measure of damages differ. 43
39. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §80.30(3) (1977) (party forcing sheriff to levy on property must
hold sheriff harmless if levy is subsequently determined wrongful); FLA. STAT. §585.10 (1977)
(Department of Agriculture must indemnify owners of animals destroyed by Department).
40. This categorization rejects, as have the Florida courts, the California division into
"implied contractual indemnity" and "implied non-contractual indemnity," a superfluous
dichotomy which ignores the basic policy underlying implied indemnification. See Cahill Bros.
v. Clementina Co., 208 Cal. App. 2d 367, 25 Cal. Rptr. 801 (1962); Comment, Contribution
and Indemnity in California, 57 CAL. L. REv. 490 (1969). The basis for the right to indemnity under Florida law has been attributed to contract, Stuart v. Hertz Corp., 802 So. 2d
187 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1974) and equity, Magnum Marine v. Kenosha Auto Transport Corp.,
481 F.2d 983 (5th Cir. 1978); and although the California categorization has been rejected,
implied indemnity has been awarded to owners of defective equipment (provided that the
owner was not "actively" negligent) from parties with whom they contracted to maintain
equipment when the owners were held liable for defects in the equipment attributed to the
negligence of the party who had contracted to maintain it. See, e.g., Seaboard Airline Ry. v.
American Dist. Elect. Protective Co., 106 Fla. 330, 148 So. 816 (1982); Armor Elevator Co.,
Inc. v. Elevator Sales and Service, Inc., 809 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1975); Mims Crane
Service, Inc. v. Insley Mfg. Corp., 226 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1969).
41. FLA. STAT. §768.31(4) (1977).
42. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of North America v. King, 340 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 4th D.C.A.
1976); Mims Crane Service, Inc. v. Insley, 226 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1969); Morse Auto
Rental, Inc. v. Dunes Enterprises, Inc., 198 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1967); Fountainebleau
Hotel Corp. v. Postol, 142 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1962). But see, Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Alterman Transport Lines, Inc., 465 F.2d 710, 716 (5th Cir. 1972), in which the court, applying Florida common law, held that implied indemnity did not permit the indemnitor to
collect for attorney's fees expended in prosecuting the suit for indemnity.
48. These alternative theories of recovery among joint tortfeasors may, of course, be
alternatively pleaded. Florida Power Corp. v. Taylor, 332 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1976).
The party entitled to indemnity cannot be liable to the indemnitor for contribution, although
the party seeking indemnity if unsuccessful may seek and be liable for contribution. FLA. STAT.
§768.81(2)(f) (1977). See First Church v. City of St. Petersburg, 844 So. 2d 1302 (Fla. 2d D.C.A.
1977). This does not preclude another tortfeasor from seeking contribution from the indemnitee. Thus an employer, vicariously liable for the negligence of his employee, might be
entitled to seek indemnity from his employee, although the employee would not be entitled
to contribution from the employer. However, a joint tortfeasor whose negligence combined
with the negligence of the employee would be entitled to seek contribution from the em-
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The statutory right of a joint tortfeasor to seek contribution arises when
one tortfeasor has paid more than his share of a common liability to the
plaintiff. The basis of their common liability is predicated upon mutual
breaches of duty to the plaintiff by each tortfeasor. In theory the existence, or
nonexistence, of a joint tortfeasor would have no effect upon the liability of
either tortfeasor to the plaintiff. The right to implied indemnity, however,
arises from a breach of a duty owed by the joint tortfeasor-indemnitor to the
joint tortfeasor-indemnitee. This breach of duty is derived from independent
substantive rules of law and creates a basis of liability in favor of the joint
tortfeasor-indemnitee. Whereas the contribution action represents an action
among parties each of whom is liable to the plaintiff through their separate
conduct, the indemnity action represents an action between parties in which
the indemnitee's liability is established only through proof of breach of duty
of the indemnitor to the plaintiff. The right of the plaintiff to seek compensation in full from a particular joint tortfeasor is unaffected, that is, joint and
several liability is not abrogated. 44 The rights and obligations of the partytortfeasors to each other are, however, different under these two post-judgment
loss allocation devices.

45

A joint tortfeasor seeking contribution or a joint tortfeasor seeking indemnity can establish that right by cross-claim against a named defendant or
third party action. 4 6 And, although notions of judicial efficiency might seem
ployer, for which contribution share the employer would be entitled to indemnity from his
employee.
44. See Gerardi v. Carlisle, 232 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1969); FLA. STAT. §768.31(2)(a)
(1977). In this respect joint tortfeasor liability is distinguished from "concurrent" tortfeasor
liability.
45. Thus, a joint tortfeasor seeking both contribution and indemnity from an employer
providing workmen's compensation benefits to the injured claimant-employee had the contribution action dismissed, while the indemnity action was allowed in Firestone Tire & Rubber
v. Thompson Aircraft, 353 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1977). There the court stated: "Instead of
resting on principles of common liability, the equitable doctrine of indemnity is predicated
on the distinction between primary (active) and secondary (passive) liability between parties
where negligence is not coequal. In other words, the basis for indemnity lies in the relationship between the tortfeasors themselves, not on their common liability to the injured party."
Id. at 140.
46. See, e.g., General Dynamics Corp. v. Adams, 340 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1965) (applying
Florida law) (third party action); Peoples Gas System, Inc. v. B. & P. Restaurant Corp., 271
So. 2d 804 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1973) (third party action); Mims Crane Service Inc. v. Insley Mfg.
Corp., 226 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1969) (third party action); Chappell v. Scarborough, 224
So. 2d 791 (Fla. ist D.C.A. 1969) (cross-claim). It should be emphasized that the third party
action is intended to permit the tortfeasor entitled to indemnity to enforce his claim in the
same action and is not a procedural device through which the defendant can avoid all
liability to the plaintiff by asserting another party's sole responsibility. Thus, in Armor
Elevator Co. v. Elevator Sales & Service, Inc., 309 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1975), the defendant's third party complaint for "indemnity" was dismissed. The defendant-third party
plaintiff did not assert that it was a passive tortfeasor and that its liability if any was due to
the active negligence of the third party defendant, but rather that another party (the third
party' defendant) was the active cause of the injury and guilty of active negligence. The Third
District Court of Appeal sustained the dismissal. The failure of the third party plaintiff to
assert that it was a passive tortleasor and that its liability was derivative from the active
negligence of the third party defendant constituted a failure to plead a claim for indemnity.
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to dictate otherwise, a joint tortfeasor seeking contribution or indemnity
may withhold his claim against another named or unnamed party tortfeasor
and bring a separate action to enforce his right to contribution 47 or indemnity.4s Neither the statutorily granted right to contribution nor the
common law right to indemnity change the Pendarvisrule that one tortfeasor
cannot join another tortfeasor as a party defendant to the plaintiff's action. 49
A tortfeasor seeking contribution must establish that a nonjoined party from
whom he seeks contribution is jointly liable to the plaintiff before he can
enforce his statutory right to contribution. 50 By establishing the liability of
one joint tortfeasor, the plaintiff has not deprived another joint tortfeasor
who is not named in the original action or joined as a third party defendant
of his due process rights to litigate his liability to the plaintiff in a subsequent contribution action before being obliged to provide contribution to
the joint tortfeasor seeking that contribution. Similarly, the constitutional right
of the joint tortfeasor-indemnitor to be heard must be preserved. The right to
indemnity, however, is based on the concept that the liability of the indemnitee
is derived from the conduct of the indemnitor. The indemnitee may, therefore,
by properly notifying the indemnitor, "vouch in" the indemnitor to the action

The subsequent assertion that the third party defendant's active negligence was the sole
cause of the injury was a pleading of "avoidance without confession" and likewise subject to
dismissal as a third party complaint. 309 So. 2d at 46.
The third party complaint is an effective device through which a defendant may assert
his claim to indemnity. It is not, however, a procedural device through which a defendant
can force joinder of a party-defendant to the plaintiff's action. Since the right to receive
indemnity does not alter the concept of joint and several liability, the indemnitee remains
jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff. If the plaintiff h s not joined the indemnitor in
the principal action, the indemnitee cannot force that joinder. Fincher Motor Sales, Inc. v.
Lakin, 156 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1963). Similarly, the third party plaintiff is not bound
by the plaintiff's complaint and the third party plaintiff may assert a claim for indemnity
alleging that he is a passive tortfeasor in his third party complaint although the plaintiff has
alleged otherwise. Crawford Door Sales, Inc. v. Donahue, 321 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1975).
Whether the practical implication of permitting a third party action in fact does require the
plaintiff to litigate the liability of both the defendant-third party plaintiff and the third party
defendant is another, and as yet unanswered question. That the Florida supreme court thinks
that it does seem clear from its opinion in Stuart v. Hertz Corp., 351 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1977).
See note 92 infra.
47. FLA. STAT. §768.314(a) (1977). For an interesting contrast of philosophies see Ta x. Civ.
STAT. ANN. 2212(a)(2)(g) (Vernon Supp. 1978), which, unlike the Florida statute, provides that:
"All claims for contribution between named defendants in the primary suit shall be determined in the primary suit, except that a named defendant may proceed against a person not
a party to the primary suit who has not effected a settlement with the claimant."
48. E.g., Aircraft Taxi Co. v. Perkins, 227 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1969); Bordettsky v.
Hertz Corp., 171 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1965).
49. See note 46 supra.
50. This aspect of joint tortfeasor liability expresses rather clearly one important reason
why the plaintiff is well advised to join all joint tortfeasors in the same action. The plaintiff
will also find it necessary in many instances to establish the liability of joint tortfeasors in a
single action since the injuries caused to a plaintiff may exceed the assets (or insurance coverage) of any single tortfeasor. Unless the plaintiff establishes the liability of the joint tortfeasors he cannot aggregate their assets to receive full compensation.
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in which the indemnitee has been named as a tortfeasor. 51 Once the indemnitor
has been notified, he is obligated to defend the action. If the indemnitor does
not, and if the indemnitee in a subsequent action establishes his right to indemnity, the liability judgment of the plaintiff against the indemnitee is conclusive of the liability of the indemnitor to the plaintiff and there is no necessity of further legal proceedings to establish the liability of the indemnitor to
the plaintiff.52 The common law right to "vouch in" an indemnitor is a direct
product of the conceptual basis of the right to implied indemnity and it has
53
not been supplanted by the procedural right to bring a third party action.
Before further analysis of the substantive and procedural differences between the concepts of contribution and indemnity is conducted, the Florida
4
pure comparative fault system and its goals need to be discussed.
The pure comparative fault system of loss transference adopted by the
Florida supreme court in Hoffman can be treated as having two goals: a
primary goal of loss avoidance through deterrence of proscribed conduct that
causes injuries; and a secondary goal of loss transference of the costs of compensation for injuries caused by proscribed conduct. 55 The first step in the

51. See Olin's Rent-A-Car System v. Royal Continental Hotels, Inc., 187 So. 2d 349 (Fla.
4th D.C.A. 1966) in which the Royal Continental Hotel (Hotel) had been sued by an invitee
of the hotel who was injured through the negligence of Olin's Rent-A-Car System's (Olin's)
employee. Hotel notified Olin's of the suit and requested that Olin's appear and defend the
claim since it was based upon the negligence of its employee. Hotel notified Olin's that
failure to successfully defend the suit would result in Hotel proceeding to seek indemnity.
Olin's did not appear, Hotel was found liable for the negligence of Olin's employee, and
Hotel sought indemnity in a subsequent action. The Fourth District Court of Appeal recognized the right of an indemnitee to "vouch-in" an indemnitor as an effective device to enforce the right to indemnity. In reaching this conclusion, the court quoted with approval
from Littleton v. Richardson, 34 N.H. 179 (1856): "When a person is responsible over to
another, either by operation of law or by express contract . . . and he is duly notified of the
pendency of the suit, and requested to take upon him the defense of it, he is no longer regarded as a stranger because he has the right to appear and defend the action, and has the
same means and advantages of controverting the claim as if he was the real and nominal party
upon the record. In every such case, if due notice is given to such person, the judgment, if
obtained without fraud or collusion . . . will be conclusive against him whether he has appeared or not .... " 187 So. 2d 351; accord, Morris v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 538,
543 (5th Cir. 1974). See generally, 3 MooRE'S FEDERAL PRAcrICE, §14.021 at 14-51 through
14-52 (2d ed. 1974).
52. See Olin's Rent-A-Car System v. Royal Continental Hotels, Inc., 187 So. 2d 349, 351-52
(Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1966). The ease with which this method can be employed to establish the
liability of the indemnitor to the plaintiff recommends itself to all potential indemnitees, as
the court stated in Morris v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 538, 543 (5th Cir. 1975) (applying Florida law): "Vouching in . .. requires nothing more than a letter with perhaps the
precaution of registered or certified mail."
53. Morris v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 538, 543 (5th Cir. 1975); Olin's Rent-A-Car
System v. Royal Continental Hotel, Inc., 187 So. 2d 349, 351 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1966).
54. For a more detailed analysis of the pure comparative fault system as it affects the
multiple party actions, see Walkowiak, supra note 8.
55. This thought as the means by which to analyze fault-based liability is not original
with me and in different form has provided the basis of a series of articles by Professor
Guido Calabresi. See, e.g., Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of
Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Non-
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process of deciding whether to shift any portion of a loss suffered by an injured party claimant to a defendant is evaluation of the conduct of the party
defendant. If that conduct falls below the legal standard established for that
form of conduct and the conduct is determined to have caused compensable

injury, the portion of the loss that represents the non-claimant-caused injury
is shifted from the claimant suffering the injury to the party defendant. 56 In
that manner, an actor is presumably deterred from following certain courses of
conduct, normally described as negligence, that may result in injury to himself
or to another. Presumptively, when the proscribed conduct is deterred, the
number of injuries that would be caused by that conduct is reduced or eliminated. Reduction of primary accident costs is theoretically accomplished when
people are deterred from conduct that causes loss by the fear of financial liability for those losses. The acceptance of this primary loss reduction aspect of the
fault system has prompted one commentator to suggest that jurisdictions that
prohibit all contribution among joint tortfeasors justify their decision with the
conclusion that the prohibition of contribution among tortfeasors promotes
further reduction of primary accident costs by deterring future wrongful conduct through the threat of full financial responsibility for jointly caused injuries.57It was during the period that Florida was among the states prohibiting
contribution among joint tortfeasors that its courts adopted and developed
doctrines of implied indemnification permiting total loss transference from one
tortfeasor to another.58 This doctrine of total loss transference among joint
tortfeasors was created by the courts and its existence rationalized with a rule
that prohibited any loss sharing among joint tortfeasors.5a The difference was
justified by articulating a set of standards through which the right to indemnity could be established. Thus, it was not sufficient for one joint tortfeasor
to establish that his liability was based upon a relative degree of fault: it was
necessary that his liability be based upon an entirely different form of conduct
or theory of liability.60 The courts adopted two basic tests, either of which
fault Allocation of Costs, 78 HARv. L. REv. 713 (1965); Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource
Allocation and Liability Rules -A Comment, 11 J. LAiw & ECON. 67 (1968).

56. In basic form this is fault-based liability. See 0. W. HoLMES,THE COMMON LAW 85-87
(Howe ed. 1963).
57. "[The Courts] had the rule of no contribution between tortfeasors, and other related
rules, and inasmuch as these rules would be 'well supported in principle' if they served to
deter people from participation in legally objectionable activity, the courts proceeded to assume that they did have this deterrent effect, without any proof whatever of the fact."
Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. Rev. 130, 134 (1932).
Criticism of the rationale underlying the rule which prohibited contribution among joint
tortfeasors has occupied untold hours and resulted in reams of legal scholarship, a sampling
of which is collected in a brief bibliography in Walkowiak, supra note 8, at 99 n.105.
58. See, however, Stuart v. Hertz Corp., and other cases discussed at note 86 infra.
59. In Slattery v. Marra Bros., 186 F.2d 134, 138 (2d Cir. 1951), Judge Learned Hand,
recognizing the anomaly, stated that decisions granting indemnity "may perhaps be accounted for as lenient exceptions to the doctrine that there can be no contribution between
joint tortfeasors, for indemnity is only an extreme form of contribution."
60. Thus it was not sufficient for a party seeking indemnity to prove that he was held to
a higher standard of care than the party from whom the indemnity was sought. Indemnity
would be granted only if the party seeking indemnity was a passive or secondary tortfeasor
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might be employed to establish that the right to indemnity existed.61 These are
discussed below.
ACTIVE-PASSIVE

A joint tortfeasor may be entitled to indemnity when the joint tortfesorindemnitee's negligence is "passive" and the joint tortfeasor-indemnitor,
through whom the indemnitee has been found passively negligent, is guilty of
"active" negligence. The distinction between active and passive negligence has
created problems of interpretation, since the grammatical impact of these
words must be distinguished from their legal definition. Thus, in Florida
Power and Light Co. v. General Safety Equipment Co., 62 the Third District
Court of Appeal undertook to define "active" and "passive" negligence. In that
case, the plaintiff had been injured when motorized equipment operated by
Dade County came in contact with high voltage lines owned by Florida Power.
The plaintiff sued both Dade County and Florida Power as joint tortfeasors
and both brought third party actions6 3 seeking indemnity from the manufacturers of the motorized equipment that had come into contact with the power
lines. The trial court dismissed both third party complaints.64
The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal of the third
party complaints seeking indemnity because the plaintiff had alleged that the
defendants, Florida Power and Dade County, were liable for "active" negligence.
If recovery were had against the defendants [Florida Power Company
and Dade County] upon proof of their negligence as alleged it could not
be said that their liability for their negligence in the form of acts or
omissions was such as to place them in the position of one who, being
without fault, had been subjected to vicarious or technical tort liability
for the wrongful conduct of another. 65
and the party from whom he sought indemnity was an active or primary tortfeasor as these
terms were defined. Aircraft Taxi Co. v. Perkins, 227 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1969). See
also Duncan v. Judge, 43 Wash. 2d 836, 264 P.2d 865 (1953). But see Panasuk v. Seaton, 277
F. Supp. 979 (D. Mont. 1968); Wheeler v. Glazer, 137 Tex. 341, 153 S.W.2d 449 (1941). It has
been suggested that the standards for awarding indemnity adopted by some jurisdictions do
measure degrees of fault and arrive at the decision to award indemnity on that basis. Comment, supra note 40, at 496-99.
61. Some courts have suggested that there is a third category of implied indemnity action
in Florida. This third category would include all actions for implied indemnity by the
owner of an automobile against the negligent operator of that motor vehicle. E.g., General
Dynamics Corp. v. Adams, 340 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1965). The author has subsumed these
actions for indemnity within the two major tests as the same rules for determining indemnity have been applied to the automobile ownership cases as have been applied in all
other cases.
62. 213 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1968).
63. It has been consistently recognized in Florida that a third party action is an effective
procedural device by which to prosecute an indemnity claim. See note 46 supra.
64. 213 So. 2d at 488.
65. Id. Thus, if Florida Power had a duty to act and failed to act its negligence would be
active negligence. Under the present loss allocation system this would permit it to pursue an
action for contribution from their joint tortfeasors, See Florida Power Corp. v. Taylor, 332
So. 2d 687 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1976).
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Florida Power asserted however, that its negligence, if any, was "passive" because the plaintiff had alleged that it was negligent for failing to de-energize
the power lines with which the motorized crane made contact. The Third
District Court of Appeal responded to this contention by stating that Florida
Power was entitled to indemnity only if it was a "passive" tortfeasor and then
juxtaposed the definition of "passive" negligence with negligent failure to act.
Although in defining negligence, omission to act is frequently referred
to as passive negligence, it does not follow that it is entitled to be so
classified in contemplation of the rule regarding indemnification ....
The difference here is that the liability of the power company, if established on the allegations of negligence in the complaint, would not be a
vicarious or technical liability arising from tort of another, but its liability would result from its active negligence through its failure or omission
to act as required under certain circumstances. 66
The right to implied indemnification is available to a tortfeasor who has been
held liable to a plaintiff due to his technical or vicarious liability. Florida
Power's failure to correct a dangerous condition when it had a duty to do so
was "active" negligence. The proscribed conduct that would reduce primary
costs was failing to act when there was an affirmative duty to do so. Thus, the
First District Court of Appeal in Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Fellows,67 found
that the failure of store employees to correct a dangerous store display was
active negligence even though the display had been constructed by a third
party. The store was not entitled to bring an action for indemnification against
the third party because it had an affirmative duty to its customers to discover
and correct the defect. The basis of liability to the plaintiff was the failure to
act when there was an affirmative duty to do so. The store employees were the
"actors" through whose breach of duty the plaintiff had suffered injury. In its
normative aspect, liability for negligence seeks to deter persons from not acting,
that is, to require that they act when there is a dearly defined duty to do so.68
66. 213 So. 2d at 488.
67. 153 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1963).
68. Compare Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Fellows, 153 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1963),
with Kroger Co. v. Bowman, 411 S.W.2d 339 (Ky. Ct. App. 1967) (indemnity awarded to store
for injuries suffered when defective carton of soda split, causing injuries to store's customer).
In Kroger, as in Winn-Dixie, the beverage seller provided the cartons and set up the display.
In Kroger, however, the court found that the store employees were not negligent in failing to
discover the defective carton. 411 S.W.2d at 343. In Winn-Dixie, the store employees had not
only discovered the defective display, but also had been registering complaints to the beverage
seller for some months before the accident. 153 So. 2d at 51. Thus the decisions are perfectly
compatible for if the store employees in Winn-Dixie had not known of the dangerous condi-

tions of the display and had no duty to discover its danger, it too would have been entitled
to indemnity. See generally Comment, The Allocation of Loss Among Joint Tortfeasors, 41
So. CAL. L. REv. 728, 745-46 (1968). It is important to note at this time how the potential allocation of loss will differ when the decision is made to place an affirmative duty
to act upon a party. If there had been no affirmative duty to act on the part of the WinnDixie employees, Winn-Dixie would be entitled to full indemnification. The entire loss would
be borne by the beverage seller. There would be no negative incentive to avoid liability by
the Winn-Dixie employees. When there is an affirmative duty to act, Winn-Dixie shares the
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In order to establish the right to implied indemnity, the indemnitee must
be found liable to the plaintiff for the culpable conduct of another person. The
clearest explication of this principle is found in Mims Crane Service, Inc. v.
Insley Mfg. Corp.69 The plaintiff was seeking compensation for property damage caused when the boom on a crane collapsed. Mims Crane Service had sold
the crane to the plaintiff, and as the vendor of the defective crane, Mims was
liable to the plaintiff for the damage. In deciding whether Mims was entitled
to seek implied indemnification from other party defendants whose negligence
combined with the defective crane to cause the plaintiff's damage, the Second
District Court of Appeal examined the basis of Mims' liability to the plaintiff.
If Mims' liability was due to its own negligence, Mims would not be entitled
to indemnity.
Conversely, if recovery should be had against Mims solely on the theory
of negligence in furnishing the defective equipment, or, stated another
way, if Mims' liability to plaintiff was not based on Mims' negligence
but upon ownership of the defective truck-crane, then Mims should not
be precluded from asserting its right of action for indemnification ....
[Plaintiff's] complaint did not allege that Mims knew or should have
known of the defective condition of the equipment, which knowledge
could have the effect of making Mims' negligence not secondary or
passive, but primary or active.
We conclude that the third party complaint stated a cause of action
for indemnity....70

The critical issue to be determined before Mims would be entitled to indemnification, therefore, was not whether the vendor, Mims, was the least
negligent party, but rather, whether the injured party sought recovery from
Mims for a breach of duty owed by Mims to the plaintiff exclusive of mere
ownership of the defective crane. That is, it must be determined whether
Mims was merely an "innocent" conduit through whom compensation for
injuries caused to the plaintiff by the actively negligent tortfeasors would be
passed or whether it was also an "active" tortfeasor. As between the plaintiff
and the owner, Mims, the non-self-caused injuries of the plaintiff should be
compensated by the technically liable joint tortfeasor Mims. This is no less
true under pure comparative negligence because there claimants are entitled to
collect compensation only for their non-self-caused injuries.71 When, however,
a technically liable tortfeasor is innocent of active negligence, as between him
and an actively negligent joint tortfeasor, the courts have consistently held that
the loss should be transferred to the active tortfeasor in order to effect primary
loss reduction. In the interest of maximizing victim compensation, the techloss occasioned upon the claimant with the party constructing the display. In this manner,
theoretically, Winn-Dixie will encourage its employees to seek out and correct dangerous
conditions existing on their premises and therefore reduce primary losses by correcting conditions that cause injuries. Similarly the loss occasioned upon the customer is shared by the
store and the beverage seller, thereby spreading the loss.

69. 226 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1969).
70. Id. at 840.
71. See note 80 supra.
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nically liable tortfeasor is liable to the claimant but then that party is entitled
to seek indemnity from the manufacturer of the injury producing instrumentality.
When the owner of a defective instrumentality violates a duty he owes to
the plaintiff, the owner's liability is no longer technical and the remedy of
implied indemnity is not available to transfer liability to a joint tortfeasor.
Thus, if Mims had negligently failed to inspect the truck-crane in the presence
of a duty to do so, it would not have been entitled to implied indemnity. If a
manufacturer can establish that the owner of a product has been "actively"
negligent in the use of the product, the owner will not be entitled to indemnity
from the manufacturer for injuries caused to innocent third parties by the
negligent use, even though the manufacturer was also negligent in designing
the product. In General Motors Corp. v. County of Dade,72 General Motors
sold buses equipped with tempered glass to Dade County. A woman bus
passenger was injured when an unknown person threw a brick at one of these
buses, shattering the glass. The passenger sued the county and received judgment for her injuries. 3 Dade County sued the manufacturer for indemnity.
After a trial on the issues a jury awarded Dade County indemnity.
The Third District Court of Appeal reversed the award of indemnity to
Dade County.7 4 If Dade County had been found liable to the woman passenger
solely due to its ownership of a defectively designed bus, the court would have
sustained the award of indemnity. The court found, however, that the record
in this action supported the finding that Dade County knew the bus did not
have safety glass and yet routed the bus through an area in which Dade County
officials should have anticipated that missiles of this sort might be thrown. As
between the county and the manufacturer, the manufacturer was the passive
tortfeasor, or as the court stated:
A vendee-user of a product is not entitled to indemnity from a manufacturer for damages the former is required to pay a third party when,
as here, the vendee-user's fault
goes beyond the mere negligent failure to
5
discover a product defect7
Criticism of this decision as representing a phony kind of judicial distinction masking a more basic judicial interest in sending the bills to the party
whom the court deems should pay, ignores the effect it may have upon reducing primary accident costs. When primary losses may thus be theoretically reduced through the assessment, in this case to Dade County, of liability for the
negligently inflicted injuries, the right to indemnity will not be granted. Dade
County could have prevented this incident (and thereby reduced primary costs)
by not routing this bus through this "high missile" area or by purchasing buses
72. 272 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1973).
73. The plaintiff's action against Dade County is reported in Itoman v. County of Dade,
248 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 3d D.CA. 1971).
74. General Motors Corp. v. County of Dade, 272 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1973). See
also General Dynamics Corp. v. Adams, 340 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1965).
75. General Motors Corp. v. County of Dade, 272 So. 2d 192, 194 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1973).
See also Winn-Dixie v. Fellows, 153 So. 2d 45, 51 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1963).
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with safety glass. Its negligence in routing this bus caused this injury to the
plaintiff. The economic savings it realized by the purchase of a bus without
safety glass ultimately resulted in liability for the plaintiff's injuries which
could not be totally shifted to the manufacturer. If Dade County had brought
this action under current law it would be required at least to share the loss.76
It is only when the "conduct" of the defendant-indemnitee can no longer
be said to be an active cause of the injuries to the plaintiff that indemnity is
awarded, for otherwise the injury-causing "conduct" will not be deterred
through imposition of financial responsibility for the costs of the loss suffered.
Thus, the right to indemnity is denied to a tortfeasor who although a passive
participant in the initially negligent act, ratifies the conduct of an active tortfeasor and the act of ratification contributes to the plaintiff's injury.77 But even
within the ambit of active-passive negligence, concepts of enterprise liability
manifest themselves. Consequently, a tortfeasor who is vicariously liable for the
active negligence of his servant will be permitted to seek indemnity from his
servant, but he will be denied the right to indemnity from a third party tortfeasor whose negligence combined with that of the employer's servant to cause
the plaintiff's injuries.78 It was a recognition of this fact that gave rise to the
concept that implied indemnity could effect partial loss shifting to enterprises
or parties responsible for injuries. If this result was accomplished in an efficient
manner, a better secondary loss distribution system might result. An effort to
interpret the remedy of implied indemnity in order to accomplish that result
was attempted by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in a short-lived decision,
Stuart v. Hertz Corp.

9

In Stuart, the plaintiff, Ruth McCutcheon, and her husband were seeking
to collect for injuries which were suffered in an accident in which Stafford
76. See discussion of Winn-Dixie v. Fellows at note 68 supra.
77. Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Federal Detective Agency, Inc., 157 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 3d
D.C.A. 1963).
78. Dura Corp. v. Wallace, 297 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1974). Plaintiff was injured by a
rock thrown by a lawn mower operated by Diaz' son. Plaintiff joined both, Dura, the manufacturer of the lawn mower alleging defective design, and Diaz under the theory of respondeat superior for the actions of his son. Diaz cross-claimed for indemnity against Dura.
The jury found for the plaintiff against Diaz and Dura, and found for Diaz on the cross-claim
seeking indemnity. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed the finding that Diaz was
entitled to indemnity. Since he was found vicariously liable for the active negligence of his
son, he could not seek indemnity from a party other than the party whose active negligence
subjected him to liability. Id at 621.
The new Florida contribution statute would permit Diaz and his son to share the costs of
compensating the plaintiff with the manufacturer based upon their relative degrees of fault.
For purposes of deciding these proportional shares, Diaz and his son would be treated as one
party. See FLA. STAT. §768.31(3)(b) (1976). See also Lincenberg, 318 So. 2d at 393.
79. 302 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1974), rer/d, 351 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1977). A similar
factual situation was treated differently in Lindsey v. Austin, 336 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 3d D.C.A.
1976). In Lindsey, a physician had operated to remove a corn from a woman's foot and was
sued for malpractice. He brought a third party action for indemnity from another physician
who had treated the woman after the surgery, alleging that the second physician had aggravated the injuries caused the woman. The Third District Court of Appeal regarded the third
party claim for indemnity as a suit for contribution and advised the trial court to treat it as
such.
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Holbrook negligently injured Mrs. McCutcheon while driving an automobile
owned by the Hertz Corporation.o The defendants, Hertz Corp. and Holbrook,
brought a third party claim against Dr. Frank Stuart, alleging that, while
treating Mrs. McCutcheon for the injuries she suffered in the accident, the
doctor negligently severed Mrs. McCutcheon's carotid artery, causing an orthopedic disability and neurological injuries for which they were passively liable.13
The trial court refused to dismiss the third party complaint for indemnity.
Although this case was decided after the supreme court's decision to adopt
pure comparative negligence, the Fourth District refused to judicially adopt
contribution among joint tortfeasors, 82 commenting that there were no reported cases within the state recognizing the right of a tortfeasor initially
liable to collect indemnity from a physician who negligently aggravated the
injury in the course of treatment. 83 As the court noted, the right to implied
indemnity was a judicial creation that has a separate and distinct existence
fundamentally different from the right to contribution among joint tortfeasors. 84 The court went on to state that it could not find a contractual basis
for the right to implied indemnity in this action, and that it had not been
established that the physician owed a specific duty to the tortfeasor.85 Nevertheless, the Stuart court held that tortfeasors Hertz Corp. and Holbrook had a
cause of action for implied indemnity against the physician who aggravated the
injuries. The tortfeasors were entitled to be indemnified for the cost of the

80. Stafford Holbrook's father, George Holbrook, was sued individually and as the father
and next friend and guardian ad litem of Stafford Holbrook. As this is not essential to our
discussion of the case, all references to George Holbrook have been eliminated or consolidated
with those of his son.
81. A tortfeasor is liable for all of the injuries which naturally flow from the original
tortious act. "Where one who has suffered personal injuries by reason of the negligence of
another exercises reasonable care in securing the services of a competent physician or surgeon,
and in following his advice and instructions, and his injuries are thereafter aggravated or increased by negligence, mistake, or lack of skill of such physician or surgeon, the law regards
the negligence of the wrongdoer in causing the original injury as the proximate cause of the
damages flowing from the subsequent negligent or unskillful treatment thereof and holds him
liable therefor ... " J. Ray Arnold Corp. v. Richardson, 105 Fla. 204, 141 So. 133, 135 (1932),
quoted with approval in Stuart v. Hertz Corp., 302 So. 2d 187, 189 (Fla. 4th D.C.A.) and 351
So. 2d 703, 707 (Fla. 1977).
82. 302 So. 2d at 190-91, citing an earlier decision from the same district in which the court
expressly refused to abandon the long-standing rule prohibiting contribution among joint
tortfeasors, Maybarduck v. Bustamante, 294 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1974). However, as
suggested previously, this position may not represent the individual philosophy of the court
so much as it does the excoriation which would follow if a District Court did attempt to
abandon earlier precedent of the Florida supreme court. See note 7 supra. See generally,
Walkowiak, supra note 8 at 102.
83. 302 So. 2d at 189.
84. Id. at 191.
85. In this respect the court seems to be rejecting the reasoning of many of the courts
which have permitted the tortfeasor to sue for aggravation of injuries in similar circumstances.
These courts imply a right of subrogation from the injured party to the tortfeasor, compensating the injured party permitting that tortfeasor to sue for aggravation of injuries caused
by physician's malpractice. E.g., Clark v. Halstead, 276 A.D. 17, 93 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1949); Fisher
v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co., 173 Wisc. 57, 180 N.W. 269 (1920).
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damages which they would now be compelled to pay to the plaintiff as a result
86
of the physician's negligence.
Unlike the cited New York decision of Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.,8 7 this
was not an attempt by the Stuart court to adopt contribution among tortfeasors. It was, rather clearly, an attempt to shift full financial liability for an
injury to the injury-producing party (Stuart) from a party liable due to the
application of a technical rule of tort law. In Stuart, the tortfeasor initially
causing Mrs. McCutcheon's personal injuries was liable for the aggravation of
those injuries caused later in time by the physician treating Mrs. McCutcheon.
The physician's negligence was attributed to the operator of the motor vehicle
through the rather artificial device of proximate cause, that is, the doctrine that
aggravation of personal injuries through medical malpractice is always a foreseeable result for which the tortfeasor initially causing the injury will be
liable.88 The incremental increase in the financial liability of the vehicle
operator for the malpractice of a physician is as independent of the fault of
the initial tortfeasor as is the vicarious liability of an employer for the torts of
his servant. In the interests of victim compensation, the innocently injured
party should be entitled to collect fully from the tortfeasor responsible for
causing the initial injuries,89 but once the victim has been fully compensated,
the enterprise primarily responsible for the injuries should bear the cost of
compensating for those injuries. Whether expressed in terms of primary loss
deterrence or loss spreading throughout an injury-producing enterprise, the
judgment in Stuart made fine judicial sense. It was its limitation rather than its
breadth which made the Stuart decision imperfect. It did, however, manifest a
willingness on the part of the court to attempt to fashion a common law
remedy in a manner that would be consistent with the total system of postjudgment loss allocation.
When two enterprises share in the active tortious causation of a claimant's
injuries, the right to contribution applies. 9° It is only when one tortfeasor is
86. In reaching this conclusion the court relied upon Herrero v. Atkinson, 227 Cal. App.
2d 69, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490 (1964); Gertz v. Campbell, 155 11. 2d 84, 302 N.E. 2d 40 (1973); Dole
v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972); to support its
conclusion that indemnity has a strong equitable basis in addition to its fundamentally contractual basis. 302 So. 2d at 190-91. Gertz and Stuart recognize the right of a tortfeasor initially
causing an injury who has been held liable for that injury and its subsequent aggravation to
seek indemnity from a physician who has aggravated that injury. As the Stuart court
acknowledged, this principle is consistent with the "active-passive" and "duty" requirement
recognized by the Florida courts as providing a basis for the right to indemnity. 302 So. 2d at
194. Dole however went much further than either Gertz or Stuart and amounts to a judicial
rejection of the traditional rule prohibiting contribution among joint tortfeasors under the
rubric of abandoning the traditional passive-active test for awarding indemnity. The Dole
decision was codified by the New York legislature and is the basis for its proportional contribution among joint tortfeasors act. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. §1402 (1974).
87. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
88. 302 So. 2d at 189.
89. That is, that the indemnitee will remain jointly and severally liable for all injuries
caused to the claimant.
90. In this action, we can identify the two enterprises as: (1) operation of motor vehicles,
and (2) practice of medicine. They are not, however, joint tortfeasors regarding all of the
injuries suffered by Mrs. McCutcheon; therefore, the question of whether and in what amount
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only technically liable for discrete damages that the right to indemnity as defined by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Stuart applied. In Stuart the
indemnitor and indemnitee were both liable for breach of the same standard
of conduct to the plaintiff. However, the Stuart court required the actor responsible for causing discrete injuries for which another joint tortfeasor was
technically liable to assume full financial responsibility for those discrete losses.
Although the indemnitor was required to reimburse the indemnitee for only a
portion of the plaintiff's total damages, the indemnitor was reimbursing the
indemnitee for all of the damages caused by the indemnitor for which the indemnitee was held technically liable. Unlike apportionment, the plaintiff was
entitled to seek total compensation from the indemnitee for the injuries jointly
caused by the indemnitor and the indemnitee. Unlike contribution among
joint tortfeasors, indemnity as defined by the Fourth District Court of Appeal
in Stuart was total loss shifting of the designated costs of compensating for injuries from a party technically liable to a party responsible for causing injuries,
rather than a distribution of the costs of compensating for injuries among
parties jointly causing those injuries. 91 The loss was shared based upon a
criterion of comparative cause rather than of comparative degrees of negligence.
Although the required apportionment apprehended an accuracy that is sometimes wanting in the measurement of tort damages, the decision did represent
an important first step toward eliminating proportions of fault as the exclusive
basis for the decision to spread the post-judgment costs of compensating for
injuries. That the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in Stuart would
result in little, if any, predictable difference in loss distribution from that
which results from proportional contribution may, however, constitute the
unstated justification for the supreme court's rejection of Stuart.92
The supreme court opinion, however, seems to reflect a misconception of
the differences between the implied indemnity cause of action as set forth by
the Fourth District, contribution, and apportionment among concurrent tortfeasors.
[T]he court here finds itself faced with the question of whether to apportion the loss between the initial and subsequent rather than joint or
concurrent tortfeasors. This cannot be done.
An active tortfeasor should not be permitted to confuse and obfuscate
Hertz would be entitled to contribution from Dr. Stewart has been left unanswered. That the
initial injuries suffered by Mrs. McCutcheon are, relative to Hertz and Dr. McCutcheon, the
sole financial responsibility of the "negligent" Hertz Corp., seems obvious. They are, at best,
joint tortfeasors regarding the aggravation of the injuries caused Mrs. McCutcheon by Dr.
Stewart's alleged "negligence" after she was brought to him for treatment of her initial injuries. The "proportion" of fault attributable to the two parties for these injuries (the
aggravation of Mrs. McCutcheon's initial injuries) may be shared by Dr. Stewart and Hertz
based upon their relative proportions of fault of a common liability. FLA. STAT. §768.31(2)(b)
(1977).
91. See Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 20 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S. 2d 382
(1972). See also Pachowitz v. Milwaukee and Suburban Transport Corp., 56 Wis. 2d 383, 202
N.W.3d 268 (1972).
92. 351 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1977) (Boyd, J., dissenting in part and concuring in part;

Overton, CJ., dissenting).
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the issue of his liability by forcing the plaintiff to concurrently litigate
a complex malpractice suit in order to proceed with a simple personal
injury suit.93
As noted, however, Hertz sought to shift a portion of the losses it suffered to
the negligent physician after the plaintiff sought full compensation from Hertz.
The Stuart indemnification doctrine announced by the Fourth District was not
an attempted substitution of joint tortfeasor liability and consequent substitution of apportionment among joint tortfeasors. Nevertheless, it seems implicit
in the supreme court's majority opinion, and in Justice Boyd's separate
94
opinion, that the supreme court perceived it as such.
Thus, the attempted experiment in modifying the active-passive implied indemnity doctrine undertaken by the Fourth District Court of Appeal failed to
serve as a stepping stone in the further development of a more equitable postjudgment loss distribution system, and the all-or-nothing approach was endorsed by the Florida supreme court as one of the distinguishing characteristics
of implied indemnity. 95
Regardless of whether implied indemnity required a total shifting of all
losses or permitted a partial allocation of loss, the active-passive test for determining the entitlement to the right to indemnification has not accommodated
all of the circumstances in which indemnity has been granted. It has led to
some criticism and an attempt by some Florida courts to substitute an additional and, as some have suggested, a more technically appropriate standard.
PRIMARY-SECONDARY

A party whose liability to a third person is derived from a legal relationship
with another party may be entitled to indemnification from the party through
whose acts his liability is established. The party committing the act or omission
is called the "primary" tortfeasor, and the party who is liable as a result of this
relationship is called the "secondary" tortfeasor. The primary-secondary tortfeasor test has been adopted in Florida to supplement the active-passive test to
determine whether a joint tortfeasor is entitled to receive indemnity. The joint
tortfeasor's right to indemnity is established under this test by: (1) examining
93. 351 So. 2d at 706 (emphasis supplied). A third party action does not require the
plaintiff to establish the liability of the third party defendant to the plaintiff. The plaintiff
establishes the liability of the defendant-third party plaintiff who in turn establishes the
liability of the third party defendant to him. See Mount Sinai Hosp. of Greater Miami v.
Mora, 342 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1977).
94. Justice Boyd, concurring in part and dissenting in part, advocated a proportionate reduction in the total liability of Hertz to the plaintiff for the amount of loss suffered by the
plaintiff attributable to the aggravation of her injuries due to the malpractice of the physician.
351 So. 2d at 707.
95. The court cited with particular approval, the rule stated in Transcon Lines v. Barnes,
498 P.2d 502, 509 (Ariz. 1972): "It must be remembered that indemnity is an all or nothing
proposition damage-wise, and hence should be an all or nothing proposition fault-wise. ApStated in the positive the cases mean
portionment of damages is not contemplated by it ....
simply that indemnity between tortfeasors is allowable only where the whole of the fault was
in the one against whom indemnity is sought." 351 So. 2d at 706.
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the character of his conduct affecting the plaintiff in order to establish whether
his liability is derivative, and (2) examining the legal relationship between that
tortfeasor and the tortfeasor through whose conduct he is being held liable.
The primary-secondary test was endorsed by the Fourth District Court of
Appeal in Maybarduk v. Bustamante.98
In Maybarduk, the plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action against
Maybarduk, a surgeon; Mercy Hospital, the hopsital in which Maybarduk had
performed the surgery; and Bustamante, !he surgeon's assistant who had been
provided by the hospital to assist during the surgery. 97 The plaintiff alleged
that the defendants had failed to remove one of their surgical instruments
during surgery. Maybarduk cross-claimed for indemnity against Bustamante
and Mercy Hospital. He alleged that his liability was vicarious and his
negligence, if any, was passive. The trial court granted a motion to dismiss the
cross-claim for failure to state a cause of action. The Fourth District reversed,
stating that whether Maybarduk was an active or a passive tortfeasor was a
question of fact.98 The Court discussed the primary and secondary liability of
Maybarduk, Bustamante, and Mercy Hospital in the following terms:

96. 294 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1974).
97. The plaintiffs also sued the malpractice insurers of the hospital and the surgeon. This
was possible since the Florida supreme court already had held that an injured party is a third
party beneficiary of a liability insurance contract and has the right to bring a direct action
against the liability insurer issuing the policy. Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
The Florda Insurance and Tort Reform Act of 1977, 1977 Fla. Laws, 1977, ch. 77-468, §39,
statutorily abolished direct action against liability insurers by creating FLA. STAT. §768.063
(1977) [hereinafter all references will be to the codification]. The effect of liability insurance
upon loss allocation is discussed infra, at note 128 and accompanying text. The new provision
does not alter the rules of discovery regarding insurance coverage, however. And while the
new provision prohibits naming any liability insurer as a party defendant initially, it does
require that the liability insurer file a statement in its own name indicating the insured, the
policy limits and any policy or coverage defenses which the insurer intends to assert. FLA.
STAT. §768.063(3) (1977). The intent of the statute seems rather dearly to return to the preShingleton rule followed in Florida so that jury verdicts will not be "tainted" by the knowledge that the defendants are insured. Thus, claimant's attorneys will be forced to resort to
voir dire, for instance, and other such devices to introduce the fact that the defendants are
insured. It has long been a proper challenge to a juror's qualifications that he has a financial
interest in the outcome of a lawsuit. If a juror owns stock in defendants' liability insurance
company, that juror may be struck for cause, even if, as is the case in most jurisdictions, the
liability insurer is not named in the law suit. "It is well settled that stockholders of an insurance company which carries liability insurance indemnifying a party to an action from a
judgment against it in that case are 'interested in the result of the case' and not qualified to
serve as jurors, and that to conceal such disqualification would 'abridge the right of a plaintiff to pursue the lawful procedure in the selection of a jury;' and that this is true whether
actual injury resulted or not." Shipman v. Johnson, 89 Ga. App. 620, 622, 80 S.E.2d 717,720
(1954). ,See also, Mitchell v. Vann, 278 Ala. 1, 174 S.E2d 501 (1965). Under FLA. STAT.
§768.063(4) (1977), the insurer may be named after the liability of its insured has been established for the purpose of entry of judgment against the insurer. Thus, the supreme court's
interpretation of the doctrine of set-off in Stuyvesant Ins. Co. v. Bournazian, 342 So. 2d 471
(Fla. 1976) discussed infra at note 141, is unaffected by this section.
98. 294 So. 2d at 378 (citing with favor Peoples Gas Systems, Inc. v. B. &cP. Restaurant
Corp., 271 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1973)).
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Whether Bustamante was Maybarduk's "borrowed servant" or the hospital's employee (which fact is yet to be determined) would not necessarily be determinative of the respective primary and secondary liability
as between Maybarduk and the hospital. If it is shown that the hospital
owed Maybarduk a duty then notwithstanding the fact that Bustamante
was Maybarduk's borrowed servant over whom Maybarduk had supervision and control, indemnification might still lie against the hospital if
it could be shown that the hospital's omission of the duty (to furnish a
qualified assistant) was the primary cause of the injury.99
This concept of duty to the indemnitee, discussed by the Maybarduk court as
primary-secondary liability, is frequently an element of the active-passive test
for implied indemnification and is consistent with that basis for awarding indemnity to a tortfeasor.100 If Maybarduk had been found actively negligent in
personally failing to discover the surgical instrument when he had a duty to do
so, he would be denied indemnity from his joint tortfeasors, that is, Bustamante
and Mercy Hospital. His right to implied indemnity was contingent upon proof
that his liability to the patient was based solely upon the fact that he was the
chief surgeon during an operation in which a surgical instrument was not removed, and that the person from whom he sought indemnity owed him a duty
to discover the instrument and breached that duty or, in the case of the hospital, that it had a duty to provide him with a qualified assistant and breached
that duty.10 1 Thus interpreted, implied indemnity can be approached quite
readily as a two-pronged application of traditional breach of duty analysis, the
first prong consisting of a finding that breach of duty caused injury to a plaintiff and by operation of law makes the indemnitee a joint tortfeasor. The
second prong consists of a finding that there is a duty running from the indemnitor to the indemnitee to act or to forbear injury.102 This duty of the
99. 294 So. 2d at 378 (emphasis by the court).
100.
Florida
Service,
101.

See, e.g., General Dynamics Corp. v. Adams, 340 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1965) (applying
law); Winn Dixie, Inc. v. Fellows, 153 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1963); Mims Crane
Inc. v. Insley Mfg. Corp., 226 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1969).
See Aircraft Taxi Co. v. Perkins, 227 So. 2d 722, 723 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1969) in which

the court denied the right to indemnity to a common carrier against another vehicle involved
in the collision, stating: "Therefore, Aircraft's (the common carrier's) driver could not have
indemnity from the driver or owner of the other car, and Aircraft, in claiming indemnity from
the latter stands in no better or higher position than its driver in that regard. There was no
duty running to Aircraft from the driver of the other car, as there was to its own driver."

(emphasis supplied). See also, Stembler v. Smith, 242 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1970); State
v. McLaughlin, 315 S.W.2d 499 (Mo. App. 1958).
102. This can be distinguished from contribution among joint tortfeasors. Contribution
is loss-sharing among tortfeasors liable for the same injury in allocated shares. The liability of
the tortfeasors is established when they each breach a duty to the plaintiff and one of the
tortfeasors jointly and severally liable for the injuries pays more than his share for the injuries caused. Its basis therefore lies in effective secondary cost reduction through loss-sharing.
See Walkowiak, supra note 8 at 99 for a more extensive discussion of contribution in a pure
comparative negligence system. Indemnity is total loss-shifting from one tortfeasor to another
and its justification must be found in either effective primary cost reduction through lossshifting to a party who will be deterred from injury producing conduct or secondary loss reduction through loss shifting to a more effective cost distributor than the tortfeasor initially
assessed for the damages.
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indemnitor to the indemnitee may be created by (1) contract between the indemnitor and indemnitee, 10 3 (2) the negligent performance of a duty assigned
by a master to a servant, 10 4 or (3) application of law. 0 5
Since the comparative fault system has the twin goals of primary cost reduction by deterrence of injury-producing conduct, and effective compensation
and distribution of the secondary costs of accidents, the primary-secondary test
for implied indemnification is consistent in principle with the pure comparative negligence system adopted in Florida. The party whose conduct is responsible for the injury will be deterred through financial loss representing the cost
of compensating for injuries that resulted from his conduct. The indemnitee
has had duty owed him breached. The claimant has had a duty owed him
breached. Indemnitors will be deterred from breaching those duties if civil
liability for the claimant's injuries will ultimately be borne exclusively by
indemnitors. Thus examined, the doctrine of implied indemnity under either
the active-passive test or the primary-secondary test satisfies the desire to effect
primary cost reduction. The secondary costs of accidents are theoretically borne
entirely by the indemnitor.
If however, implied indemnity does not represent a sound secondary loss
distribution scheme, or if fault-based liability is sufficiently discredited as the
basis for compensation, implied indemnity as a method of tort loss distribution
is called into question. Implied indemnification can logically exist in a comparative fault system only when the twin goals of liability based upon fault are
satisfied. If both goals cannot be satisfied by the doctrine then some election
must be made and the doctrine modified or abandoned in order to accomplish
the most socially desirable goal. That the doctrine has the potential to do so is
clearly illustrated through analysis of a series of opinions that define the rights
of an automobile owner to sue the operator of his vehicle for indemnification
for injuries caused through negligent operation of the vehicle.
CLASSIC ILLUSTRATION: THE AUTOMOBILE OWNER v. ITS OPERATOR

In Florida, an automobile is classified as a "dangerous instrumentality" and
its owner is vicariously liable for injuries caused by the negligent operation of
his vehicle by a third person using the vehicle with the owner's consent. 06 The
owner is, therefore, generally entitled to indemnity from the operator of the
vehicle through whose active (primary) negligence the passively (secondarily)
negligent owner was found to be a joint tortfeasor.10 7 As between the owner
103. See, e.g., Suwannee Valley Elec. Co-op. v. Live Oak, P. &cG. R.R., 73 So. 2d 820 (Fla.
1954); Seaboard Airline Ry. v. American Dist. Elec. Protective Co., 106 Fla. 330, 143 So. 316
(1932); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. J.C. Penney Co., 166 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1964).
104. See, e.g., Grand Union Co. v. Prudential Bldg. Maintenance Corp., 226 So. 2d 117
(Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1969).
105. See Hutchins v. Campbell, Inc., 123 So. 2d 273, 276 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1960).
106. Southern Cotton Oil v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (Fla. 1920).
107. See, e.g., Cheek v. Agricultural Ins. Co. of Watertown, N.Y., 432 F.2d 1267 (5th Cir.
1970) (applying Florida law); Stuart v. Hertz Corp., 302 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1974);
Gerardi v. Carlisle, 232 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1969); Bordettsky v. Hertz Corp., 171 So. 2d
174 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1965); Fincher Motor Sales, Inc. v. Lakin, 156 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 3d D.C.A.
1963).
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whose liability is only technical or vicarious due to the application of a rule of
law,10s and an operator whose liability is based upon active or primary negligence, the goals of the fault. system of loss avoidance through fault deterrence
of accidents militate toward granting the owner the right to indemnity. The
owner who has not been negligent in his choice of operators is "fault" free. The
operator, however, in order to be liable to the owner and to the person injured
must have committed some negligent act and therefore also violated a duty to
the owner to drive in a non-negligent manner. The operator of the vehicle thus
must either avoid causing all injury through "faultless" driving or, as is more
pragmatic given the vagaries of fault-imposed liability, attempt to spread those
losses through liability insurance.109
Purchase of liability insurance imposes upon the insurance carrier the contractual duty to satisfy the liability of the person insured for those acts which
are covered by the policy. In theory, it is pure loss sharing." 0 All those parties
participating in an activity pay a portion of the total costs of the injuries
108. Naturally, if the owner were negligent in his choice of operators, his liability would
not be based upon "passive" or "secondary" negligence and would no longer entitle him to
receive contribution. Mims Crane Service v. Insley Mfg. Corp., 226 So. 2d 836, 840 (Fla. 2d
D.C.A. 1969).
109. If the vehicle is operated with the owner's permission, the operator will most often
be insured under the owner's policy. See, e.g., "Persons Insured. The following are insured
under Part I [liability coverage].
"(2) any other person using such automobile with the permission of the named insured,
provided his actual operation of (if he is not operating) his other actual use thereof is within
State Farm Mutual Automobile Policy, Part I. See also
the scope of such permission .
cases cited in note 38 supra.
The Florida Insurance and Tort Reform Act of 1977, 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-468, §12, repealed subsection 7 of §325.19, which required proof of insurance at the time of vehicle inspection. The reform act, however, created a Good Driver's Incentive Fund. The Good
Driver's Incentive Fund was to be distributed to drivers who voluntarily maintained $10,000
of liability insurance for bodily injury and who received no traffic convictions for one year.
The fund would have been composed of net monies collected from an additional fine imposed
upon people convicted of moving traffic violations. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-468, §42 (codified
as Fr.A. STAT. §318.22 (1977)).
The section creating the Good Drivers Incentive Fund was declared unconstitutional per
curiam by the Florida Supreme Court on September 7, 1977. The court retained jurisdiction
to fully articulate its reasons for doing so and published those reasons on February 23, 1978
in State v. Lee, 356 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1978). The Good Drivers Incentive Fund was declared an
unconstitutional act of the legislature on the grounds that it (1) improperly used the police
power of the state to take private property from one group of individuals solely for the
benefit of another group; and (2) violates the United States and Florida constitutions in that
it constitutes an irrational classification. The court also held that the section creating the
Good Drivers Incentive Fund was severable from the xemainder of the act, Justices England
and Sundberg dissenting from this aspect of the majority's decision.
As between an owner's liability insurance policy which provided for a pro rata distribution
among insurers for losses covered by more than one insurance policy and the operator's
liability insurance policy, which provided it was excess insurance, the owner's liability insurance has been interpreted to provide primary coverage. AAAcon Auto Transp., Inc. v.
Denishar, 312 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1975) aff'd, 337 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1976). Insofar as the
owner is a lessor of the automobile, this has been codified by the Florida Insurance and Tort
Reform Act, FLA. STAT. §627.7263 (1977), discussed infra in note 122.
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caused by the activity. If the defined risk is that one out of 1,000 drivers will
injure someone and that compensation for those injuries will be $1,000, the
payment of one dollar from each of 1,000 persons involved in the enterprise of
driving may protect all of those 1,000 persons from bearing the risk of having
any one of them pay the full $1,000. Extensive debate over the deterrent effect
of fault-based liability, given the reality of liability insurance, has been carried
on in the literature." It is sufficient to say here that a system of fault-based
liability is regarded as a necessary antecedent to the right to implied indemnity.
The role of liability insurance within this scheme is relatively straightforward.
Normally the liability insurer of the joint tortfeasor-indemnitor is contractually
responsible for indemnification to the joint tortfeasor-indemnitee. Thus, any
criticism that the first goal of fault-based liability is frustrated by the pervasive
existence of liability insurance is a criticism that fault-based liability does not
deter the conduct it is expected to deter because the deterrent effect of full
110. If it were not for the fact that automobile liability insurance is such a terrible failure
at spreading losses effectively this statement would be axiomatic. This can no more be clearly
demonstrated than by reference to the automobile liability insurance system, where 56 percent
of the premium dollar is absorbed into administration costs, R. KEETON, COMPENSATION SYSTEMS:

THE

SEARCH FOR A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO NEGLIGENCE LAW

33 (1969), and of the total

compensable losses suffered in automobile accidents, only 15 percent were compensated by
liability insurers. 1 U.S. Dmr. TRANS., ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT
INJURIES, Table 15 FS, 146-47 (1970).
111. A brief and, of necessity incomplete bibliography would include: AMERICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION,

REPORT

OF SPECIAL CommFrnrEE TO STUDY AND EVALUATE THE KEETON-

O'CONNELL BASIC PROTECTION PLAN AND AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT REPARATIONS

(1968);

AMERICAN

TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, JUSTICE AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1967); W. BLUM & H. CALVEN, PUBLIC LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PRIVATE LAW PROBLEM: AUTO COMPENSATION PLANS (1965);
P. GILLESPIE & M. KLIPPER, NO-FAULT: WIAT YOU SAVE, GAIN AND LOSE WITH THE NEW AUTO
INSURANCE (1971); R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, AFTER CARS CRASH: THE NEED FOR LEGAL AND
INSURANCE REFORM (1967); R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC
VICTIM: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (1965); R. KEETON, J. O'CONNELL
& J. MCCORD, CRISIS IN CAR INSURANCE (1968); J. O'CONNELL, Tim INJURY INDUSTRY AND THE
REMEDY OF NO-FAULT INSURANCE (1971); J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY: NO-FAULT
INSURANCE FOR PRODUCTS AND SERVICES (1975); W. PROBUES, NO-FAULT INSURANCE (1971);
E. SHAPIRO, R. NEEDHAM, & J. FELDMAN, PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM: THE KEETONO'CONNELL PLAN AND ITS CRITICS

(1967);

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COM-

PANY, NO-FAULT PRESS REFERENCE MANUAL
tions and Answers, 9 FOR THE DEFENSE 25

(1977); The Keeton-O'Connell Plan- Some Ques-

(1968); Knepper, Alimony for Accident Victims?
15 DEFENSE LAW JOURNAL 513 (1966); Knepper, Review of 1975 Tort Trends, 25 DEFENSE
LAW JOURNAL 1 (1976); Knepper, Review of 1976 Tort Trends, 26 DEFENSE LAW JOURNAL 1
(1977); Marryott, The Tort System and Automobile Claims: Evaluating the Keeton-O'Connell
Proposal,52 A.B.A.J. 639 (1966); O'Connell, Is it Really Immoral to Pay Regardless of Fault?
TRIAL, October/November, 1967, at 18. The belief that the fault system deters primary costs
while a system of nonfault liability mushrooms those costs has taken on a religious fervor.
Bias
"Bad seed, evil fruit. From the outset, the concept of no-fault was fatally flawed ....
and quirks, in effect, have been enshrined in the law. By making guilt irrelevant, no-fault and
the free-and-easy riders which it has encouraged can scarcely fail to undercut highway safety,
law enforcement and the sense of personal responsibility on which a free society depends.
'Pain and suffering,' as we have said before, may be overdone but that doesn't warrant placing
a premium on license." Bleiber, Who's to Blame? No-Fault Insurance Has Run Smack Into
the Real World, BARRON'S BUS. AND FINANCIAL WEEKLY, Jan. 26, 1976, at 7. See also Knepper,
Review of 1976 Tort Trends, 26 DEFENSE LAW JOURNAL 1, 24 (1976).
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financial responsibility will be spread throughout the "enterprise" in which the
tortfeasor is engaged through the vehicle of liability insurance. The second goal
of fault-based liability, effective loss allocation or loss transference of the costs
of compensating injuries caused by the proscribed conduct, is, however, advanced through the vehicle of liability insurance. The fund from which the
injured plaintiff may expect compensation is readily available and the costs of
providing that fund are spread broadly.
Payment of a claim covered by a policy issued by a liability insurer is a
contractual obligation the latter incurred. Therefore, the insurer is not entitled to indemnity from a person covered by the policy when it satisfies this
contractual obligation. 112 This is true even if the contract is not directly issued
to the covered person. 113 If the consideration given under a car lease is in part
compensation for liability insurance coverage for the operator, the liability in5
surance company" 4 cannot seek indemnity from the operator."1 This is true

112. See cases cited in note '18 supra. The question of whether an insurer is entitled to
indemnity from a non-insured was answered in the affirmative in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Allerman
Transport Lines, Inc., 465 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1972) discussed in note 115 infra. The right of an
insurer to contribution from a non-insured tortfeasor has also been answered affirmatively.
See Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Lowe Constr. Co., 99 N.W.2d 421 (Iowa 1959), Farmers Mut.
Auto Ins. Co. v. Milwaukee Auto Ins. Co., 8 Wis.2d 512, 99 N.W.2d 746 (1959).
113. See note 109 supra.
114. Under the terms of the standard liability policy, the insurance company issuing the
policy to the owner would normally be subrogated to the owner's rights to collect indemnity.
"In the event of any payment under this policy the company shall be subrogated to all the
insured's rights of recovery therefore against any person or organization and the insured's shall
execute and deliver instruments and papers and do whatever else is necessary to secure such
rights. The insured shall do nothing after loss to prejudice such rights." Speciman Family
Automobile Policy, §13 Subrogation. Reproduced from C. BRAINARD, Atrro.lO]3LE INSURANCE,
APP. A at 539 (Ist ed. 1961).
115. See, e.g., Rouse v. Greyhound Rent-A-Car, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 1072 (M.D. Fla. 1973),
rev'd, 506 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1975); Ins. Co. of North America v. Avis Rent-A-Car, 348 So. 2d
1149 (Fla. 1977); Roth v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 269 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1972). In a truly bizarre
situation the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Alterman Transport Lines,
Inc., 465 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1972), was asked to apply Florida law to resolve a conflict between
claims of implied indemnity by a liability insurance company and a contractual indemnity
clause included in a lease. The problem owed its genesis to one defendant's failure to acquire
Interstate Commerce Commission authorization to transport goods within the state of Florida.
Therefore, Alterman Transport Lines, the party without I.C.C. authorization, contracted with
Consolidated Transport to lease a tractor-trailer rig from Consolidated, who did have I.C.C.
approval to ship freight within the state of Florida. The rig was to be operated by Alterman's
employee, Steward. The lease provided, inter alia, that Consolidated would: "indemnify and
save harmless Alterman against any claim for . . . loss that may be done to or suffered by
driver or other persons in connection with the operation to be carried out." Id. at 712. While
operating the rig, Steward rear-ended a car driven by Maquire. Maquire filed a negligence
action in state court which was settled on a pro rata basis by Allstate Insurance Company as
the liability carrier for Consolidated and Alterman Transport Lines. Allstate then brought an
implied indemnity claim against Alterman Transport Lines as the subrogee of the rights of
Consolidated under the liability insurance policy, seeking indemnity from Alterman for all
damages which Allstate was forced to pay to Maquire on behalf of Consolidated. The District
Court found that Allstate was entitled to indemnity, since Consolidated was found liable only
through the active negligence of Alterman. As a passive tortfeasor whose liability was based
solely upon ownership of the instrumentality, Consolidated, and therefore its subrogee, was
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even though, as was the case in Roth v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 1 6 the lease
agreement between the lessor and lessee specifically prohibits operation of the
leased vehicle by third parties. In Roth, the lessee (Plax) leased a car for one
week from Yellow Rent-A-Car. His contract of lease with Yellow included a
sum representing a portion of the lessor's premium for auto liability insurance
coverage. It also contained the provision: "that the rented automobile will not
be operated by anyone other than the undersigned renter without the express
7
written consent of Yellow Rent-A-Car. "11
Plax left before the end of the rental
term and turned the car over to Roth, a minor, without obtaining the written
or oral consent of Yellow Rent-A-Car. While operating the vehicle Roth struck
two elderly women. Roth, his mother, Yellow Rent-A-Car, and their insurance
entitled to implied indemnity. Alterman, however, had a contract of indemnity with Consolidated which it sought to enforce. The District Court agreed and enforced the indemnity clause
and awarded Alterman contractual indemnity from Consolidated for all damages which it had
been forced to pay, including the amount of indemnity Alterman had paid Consolidated's
insurer through the subrogation clause. The result was that Consolidated paid everything.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 710.
Under the prevailing Florida precedent, if Alterman had established that some portion of
the lease payment was allocated toward the liability insurance premium paid by Consolidated,
Allstate would not have been entitled to receive indemnity as Consolidated's subrogee. Roth v.
Old Republic Ins. Co. 269 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1972). Although the contract of indemnity would
still have been enforced between Alterman and Consolidated, Consolidated would not, in this
manner, have contracted away its liability insurance coverage. The lessor, Consolidated, under
the indemnity agreement contained in the lease, assumed the responsibility of providing insurance coverage for losses incurred. The District Court found that this type of agreement
breached the subrogation clause of Allstate's insurance policy, a finding that was not sustained
by the Fifth Circuit. 465 F.2d at 715-16. The shifting of loss from Alistate, the professional
loss distributor, to Consolidated, the "passive" tortfeasor, through the vehicle of a "hold
harmless" clause represents a dear example of inefficient loss distribution. It seems apparent
that Alterman "paid" for the insurance coverage provided by Consolidated's insurer Allstate
whether that was expressly stated or implied in the contract. The cost to Alterman of the
lease arrangement without the indemnification provision was less valuable than it was with
this provision included. This differential in value represented the contribution which Alterman made toward the cost of providing liability insurance coverage, whether it was expressed
in the contract or implied by the circumstances. This finding, however, would rather clearly
defeat any claim to indemnity that Allstate might have under the subrogation clause of the
insurance contract with Consolidated, since Consolidated would not have a claim to indemnity
in its own name. See Rouse v. Greyhound Rent-A-Car, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 1072 (M.D. Fla.
1973), rev'd, 506 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1975); Morse Auto Rentals, Inc. v. Lewis, 161 So. 2d 235
(Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1961); Roth v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 269 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1972). Consolidated
moreover represents the least efficient method of loss distribution and violates both aspects of
liability based upon fault. The active tortfeasor, Alterman (through the action of its employee) has not been deterred from its injury-producing conduct, since it has avoided all
liability. The "hold harmless" clause has permitted it to shift this loss to Consolidated, the
passive/secondary tortfeasor. The second aspect of fault-based liability, efficient and equitable
loss distribution, is likewise not satisfied. The professional loss distributor, Allstate, who is
capable of transferring these losses inter-personally and inter-temporally, has also avoided
liability. See Florida Insurance and Tort Reform Act of 1977, FiA. STAT. §627.7263 (1977),
discussed in note 122 infra.
116. 269 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1972), quashing Roth v. Cannel, 242 So. 2d 491 (Fla. Td D.C.A.
1970), overruling by implication Hertz Corp. v. Richards, 224 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1969),
followed in Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Scammaca, 303 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1974).
117. 269 So. 2d at 4.
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companies were all sued by the women." 5 The resulting suit was settled. Roth's
liability insurer advanced the sums for settlement pending judicial determination of the rights of the parties to indemnity or restitution. The trial court held
that Roth's insurer should indemnify Yellow Rent-A-Car's and Plax's insurers.
The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed. 119 The Florida supreme court
accepted jurisdiction of the case on the ground that it conflicted with its earlier
20
opinion in Susco Car Rental System of Floridav. Leonard.
Roth and Susco, however, seem readily distinguishable. In Susco, the court
had held that the owner of an automobile who leases it to another is not relieved of responsibility to an injured third party for injuries caused by an
operator of the vehicle other than the lessee even though the operation was
contrary to the express terms of the contract. 12 Susco thus resolved the right of
a plaintiff to collect from the lessor's insurer even though the operation was in
violation of the contract between the lessor and the lessee.1 22 The question
presented by Roth, however, involved the rights to post-judgment loss allocation between the lessor, the lessee, and the operator for the injuries caused by
the nonconsensual and negligent operation of the vehicle. In Roth, the plaintiff had been compensated already.
The Roth court held the insurance company would not be entitled to indemnity from the lessee's permittee, Roth, for injuries caused by his operation
of the leased vehicle. 23 The court noted that the lessee had paid a portion of
the insurance premium issued by Yellow's insurance company under the lease.
Because the lessee had made this payment the court held that the lessee's
permittee was also covered by Yellow's insurance for injuries caused to a third
person under the earlier Susco decision. The court went on to hold that the
prohibition against lending the automobile to any other person did not give
the lessor's insurance company any greater rights against the lessee's permittee
than it had against the lessee." 24 The court concluded that for reasons of public
118. See note 96 supra. While the liability insurer can no longer be named in the lawsuit as a party defendant, it is disingenuous to suggest that the courts' reasoning in regard to
insurer liability will be changed.
119. Roth v. Cannel, 242 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1970).
120. 112 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1959).
121. Id. at 835-36.
122. The Florida Insurance and Tort Reform Act of 1977, 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-468, §29
amends §627.7263 (1975) to provide: "The valid and collectible liability insurance or personal
injury protection insurance providing coverage for the lessor of motor vehicles for rent or
lease shall be primary unless otherwise stated in bold type on the face of the rental or lease
agreement .... " Thus, Susco is codified to the extent that the lessor's insurance remains
primary insurance but the intent of the statute seems plainly to anticipate a disclaimer of
even such primary coverage and the substitution of the lessor's insurance as primary insurance. New FLA. STAT. §627.7263(2) (1977) provides that each lease form shall contain a bold
face declaration if the lessor's insurance is not primary insurance and an appropriate space for
the insertion of the lessee's insurer if the lessor's insurance is not primary.
123. 269 So. 2d at 5-6. This presumes, of course, that the cost of compensating the injured party does not exceed the amount of the insurance coverage of the owner. In no event,
however, does denying the owner's insurance company the right to indemnity affect the right
of the injured party to compensation from either the owner or the actor.
124. Id. at 6.
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policy any terms of the agreement between the lessor and the lessee which
varied, circumvented, or intercepted the flow of protection from the lessor's
insurance company to the public and the lessee's permittee was invalid. 125
The right to implied indemnification of the liability carrier of the owner of
an automobile for damages paid as a result of the negligent operation of the
automobile is in all respects the same type of "passive" negligence for which
the owner should be entitled to indemnity. Liability for negligent operation of
an automobile is in all respects, based upon a technical rule of law - ownership
of a "dangerous instrumentality."'126 In the absence of liability insurance that
125. The court elaborated on its earlier Susco opinion in reaching this result. Yellow
Rent-A-Car's policy with Old Republic Insurance Company had been certified to the state and
accepted as conforming with the state's Financial Responsibility Law. FLA. STAT. §324.151(l)
(1977). The earlier Susco opinion struck down any contractual provision between a lessor and
the lessee which attempted to limit the responsibility of the lessor for injury caused to third
persons by the lessee. On this precedent, the Roth court concluded that the contractual provision under which the lessor's insurance company sought indemnity "is contrary to the provision of the Financial Responsibility law and inoperative as a basis for indemnity." 269 So. 2d
at 6-7. But see note 122 supra.
The Roth decision was further amplified by the supreme court in Ins. Co. of North
America v. Avis Rent-A-Car, 348 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 1977) on a certified question of law pursuant to Fla.App.R. 4.61, FLA. STAT. §25.031 (1977) from the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit. In Avis, an operator of a vehicle leased by Avis to the operator's employer negligently injured a third party. Avis' contract of lease and insurance contract with
its insurer provided that operators of rented vehicles were insured for $100,000 per person,
while Avis was insured for its own negligence for $500,000 per person. The operator's employer had insured itself against liability for $200,000 per person. A settlement was entered
into in which Avis' insurer paid $150,000, and the lessee-employer's insurer paid its policy
limits of $200,000. The Florida supreme court held that since Avis' insurer provided liability
insurance coverage to operators for $100,000 of personal liability, Avis' insurer was not entitled to indemnity for that amount. Id. at 1154. However, the employer's insurer argued that
Avis indirectly charged the lessee for the amount of insurance coverage Avis had and therefore, it was in violation of public policy for Avis (and Avis' insurer) not to provide that
coverage to the lessee. The court held, however, that Avis had a responsibility to provide
liability coverage adequate to meet the financial responsibility law for its liability to persons
injured who may seek compensation from Avis under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine.
Id. at 1153. Once the victim of the negligent operation of the vehicle was compensated for
the loss that occurred through the negligent use of the vehicle, the parties' - tortfeasors' rights
were governed by traditional concepts of indemnity. The loss paid for by Avis' insurer for
injuries caused to the claimant by the active negligence of the lessee (or the lessee's permittee)
can be divided into two categories. The first category, which in this case amounted to $100,000,
was for loss for which the lessee's permittee was a covered insured under Avis' liability policy.
As to this loss, it is clear Avis' insurer has no right to indemnity even though Avis' insurer
provided coverage in excess of financial responsibility limits. Id. at 1154. The second category
of loss for which Avis' insurer compensated the claimant was for injuries caused by the active
negligence of the lessee's permittee in which Avis was the only insured. Avis liability for this
amount was for possession of a dangerous instrumentality, a form of passive negligence for
which Avis' insurer was entitled to indemnity from the active tortfeasor, and as here, through
the doctrine of respondeat superior, the active tortfeasor's employer. See also A. United
Rental, Inc. v. Bradley, 352 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1977). Thus the principle thrust of
Roth, that the lessor's insurer is not entitled to pass on all of the loss occasioned by it due to
its insured's liability through the application of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine is
unaffected by Avis.
126. See Mims Crane Service, Inc. v. Insley Mfg. Corp., 226 So. 2d 836, 840 (Fla. 2d
D.C.A. 1969).
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covered the operator the owner would even be entitled to indemnity from an
employer who himself is vicariously liable when his employee is the negligent

operator of the car.12 7 The insurer of the owner providing coverage when the

vehicle is negligently operated by a non-contributing user should be entitled
to indemnity from the user, even though the user is defined by the policy as an
insured, if the mandate of implied indemnity loss distribution to the activeprimary tortfeasor is to be followed.
Protection from ultimate liability provided by the contract of insurance for
which Plax (the lessee) paid when he rented the car from Yellow (the lessor)
inured to Roth (the permittee of Plax) for all purposes, including limitation
of the right of the insurer of the lessor to seek indemnity from the lessee under
the doctrine of implied indemnity.
Clearly, if the claim for damages caused by the operator of the vehicle,
whether the lessee or his permittee, exceeded the amount of insurance coverage
provided under the lease, the owner would remain entitled to indemnity from
his lessee or the lessee's permittee. 12 It is only when the lessee, and therefore,

his permittee, is covered for liability by the owner-lessor's liability insurance
policy that the lessee and his permittee are insulated from a claim for indemnity.
The rationale for the Roth result, therefore, lies in the court's unstated conclusion that it is more socially desirable to choose a liability insurer as a means
of secondary loss distribution than it is to attempt to effect primary loss reduction through imposition of liability for injuries. To the extent that the secondary interests of tort law involve effective methods of victim compensation
this approach is sound. While it may be argued that the lessee has paid for insurance coverage for his permittee since he paid an additional amount which
compensated the lessor for the cost of insurance coverage for the lessee, the
protection provided by this policy need only inure to the parties injured by the
1 29
permittee of the lessee.

127. Hutchins v. Frank E. Campbell, Inc., 123 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1969). In
Hutchins, Kay Hutchins sought indemnity from her husband's employer, Campbell, for injuries caused to Hughes by Ms. Hutchin's car while it was operated by a Campbell employee
to whom it had been loaned by her husband. The court acknowledged this was an odd case.
Id. at 273. It then went on to hold that Ms. Hutchins' husband was entitled to a company car,
he could, with her consent, bail her car to his employer for use on company business. The
company business consisted of picking up and delivering his company car. The court found
that an employer vicariously liable for the acts of his employees, and that the owner of the car
which caused the damage are not in pari delicto. The owner of the car whose liability for
the damages is solely under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine is entitled to indemnity
from the employer of the negligent employees. Id. at 273. See Finches Motor Sales, Inc. v.
Lakin, 156 So. 2d 672, 674 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1963). Cf. Florida Rock & Sand Co. v. Cox, 344
So. 2d 1296 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1977); Dura Corp. v. Wallace, 297 So. 2d 619, 621 (Fla. 3d D.C.A.
1974).
128. Insurance Co. of North America v. Avis Rent-A-Car, 348 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 1977). See
also Hertz Corp. v. Ralph M. Parson Co., 419 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1969) (applying Florida
substantive law), affirming 292 F. Supp. 108 (M.D. Fla. 1968) as to indemnity, but reversing on
other grounds.
129. See Ins. Co. of North America v. Avis Rent-A-Car, 348 So. 2d 1149, 1153 (Fla. 1977),
discussed supra at note 125.
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The decision of the court in Protective National Ins. Co. of Omaha v.
Roberts,30 provides another view of this aspect of Florida's tort victim com-

pensation system. In Roberts, the defendant had issued a policy of automobile
insurance to the plaintiff providing for coverage of uninsured motoristss1 and

no-fault insurance benefits. 132 The plaintiff was injured as a result of a collision with an uninsured motorist. He collected the full amount of his no-fault

benefits and also sought to receive the full amount of his uninsured motorist's
coverage. The defendant insurance company sought to setoff the amount of

no-fault payments it had made to the plaintiff against the full amount of the
uninsured motorists' coverage.1 33 The court refused to set off these amounts,
stating that even though the uninsured motorist coverage is in lieu of an
amount which might be collectible from the negligent, but uninsured, motorist, the plaintiff was charged for and paid separate premiums for each category
of coverage. The court held that there can be no indemnity or setoff to an

insurance company from an insured when the carrier has charged that insured
for the coverage provided.- 4
To carry forward the Roberts analysis to the Roth situation, however, one
must be prepared to say that the parties contracted that the liability insurance
company of the lessor agreed to pay for any injury negligently caused by a
permittee of the lessee even though the lease specifically prohibited use of the
130. 287 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1973).
131. Uninsured motorists coverage must be offered by any insurer offering liability coverage. FLA. STAT. §627.727 (1977). It provides that if the insured party suffers injuries due to
the negligence of an individual who was not covered by liability insurance, the injured party
may collect for those injuries from his own insurer. It is important to note that while this
type of coverage is first person insurance, unlike the various no-fault plans proposed, it still
requires that the injured party prove that his injuries were caused by the fault of another
party before he is entitled to be compensated for those injuries. The Florida Insurance and
Tort Reform Act of 1977, 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-468, §30, added subsection (7) to FLA STAT.
§626.727 (1977) providing that pain and suffering cannot be collected in an uninsured motorist's claim unless the injury is one described in FLA. STAT. §627.737(2)(a)-(f) (1977).
132. Under the no-fault coverage then in effect, the claimant was entitled to receive compensation for his injuries from his own insurance company after a deductible and up to a
certain limit regardless of his own negligence or the negligence of another party. Florida
Automobile Reparation Reform Act, FLA. STAT. §627.730 (1975) repealed by 1976 Fla. Laws,
ch. 76-168, §3, effective July 1, 1982. It is important to note that the Florida Insurance and
Tort Reform Act of 1977, 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-468, §33, amended §627.736 so that the insurer paying the insured for no-fault benefits shall not be subrogated to the insured's action
against a tortfeasor causing those injuries, nor shall the injured party receive compensation
for those injuries from the tortfeasor. That is, the jury shall be instructed to deduct from any
damages they return for the injured party the amount of the no-fault benefits received. FLA.
STAT. §627.736(3) (1977). Thus under the new statute the procedure advocated by the plaintiff's insurer would have been followed, but the amount of these benefits would have been
deducted from an amount which the defendant's insurer would have had to pay if the defendant had been under-insured. Thus the new statute eliminates duplicate recovery by a
claimant for P.I.P. benefits and also eliminates a claimant's insurer's claim to collect for those
benefits through subrogation.
133. As provided by FLA. STAT. §627.736(3) (1977). It can be predicted that the insurer
would be entitled to such a deduction under the new Florida Insurance and Tort Reform Act.
See note 132 supra.
134. 287 So. 2d at 363-64. But see note 131 supra.
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vehicle by the permittee and even though the permittee 3 5 was a minor who
could not have leased the car in his own name. The court should recognize,
however, the right of the parties to control their respective rights and obligations contractually unless and until such contractual agreements conflict with
some underlying social policy. 136 In Roth, the court stated as one reason for
135. The difficulty which the Roth decision presents for the casual observer lies in the
fact that Yellow's insurer had been paid for risks of liability for injuries which could be
caused by negligent operation of the vehicle, but Roth's insurer had also been paid for the
risks of liability for his negligence. They are both equally capable of allocating the loss
among their insureds and both have contracted for the economic responsibility. A different
problem would exist if, as the court anticipates, a permittee were uninsured. The loss
analysis and benefits of loss spreading obviously dictate that the better loss distributor should
bear the contracted-for losses. The implication is that the insurance company for the owner
has charged premiums based upon its predicted liability for injuries caused by lessees. Therefore, liability could be increased and thus premiums increased as knowledge is gained that
permittees are covered by these policies. The basis upon which premiums are assessed is the
predictability of losses and if insurance companies can control these losses through restrictions
placed upon the lessors' rights to lease vehicles, theoretically, insurance premiums and the
costs which they represent will be reduced. That is, if insurance companies can establish that
unknown permittees are materially poorer drivers than lessees, the actuarial bases for their
predictions regarding risk have become invalid. This would not be true of the insurer providing coverage to the permittee. In both instances, it should be noted, this loss allocation takes
place after the injured party has been fully compensated.
Justification for refusing to allow two insurance companies both of whom have been paid
by the "same" party to collect from each other under implied indemnity may lie in a more
general criticism of the whole concept of subrogation, for it has been suggested that subrogation results in insurance companies jamming up the courts and increasing litigation costs
merely to accomplish the transference of the same money. Pitkin, The Dilemma of Auto
Insurance, THE AMERICAN LECION MAGAZINE 8, 48 (April 1969). This same criticism, however,
applies when one insurer seeks indemnity from another. Subrogation, however, may be distinguished, although not entirely satisfactorily, from the situation in which an insurer,
forced to compensate on behalf of its insured for injuries caused by the negligence of a third
party, subsequently seeks recovery from the negligent third person or his insurer. Economic
justification for this difference lies in the different costs assessed to the parties for their insurance. To the extent that lessors are required to pay higher premiums for injuries caused
by unknown or unwarranted permittees of their lessees, they will pass those costs on to the
lessees. Although not denominated as such, the same or similar economic result would take
place if there were no indemnification to the owner of a dangerous instrumentality held
primarily liable for the negligence of an active tortfeasor. The costs also would be passed on
to the consumer. This fault lies not in the rule of implied indemnity, but rather in the system of liability transference based upon allocation of fault to a single factor as the loss transference mechanism. Cf. George & Walkowiak, Blame and Reparation in Pure Comparative
Negligence: The Multi-PartyActior, 8 SOUTHMaSTraN U.L. REV. 1, 52-55 (1976).
136. While the Florida Insurance and Tort Reform Act of 1977 offers a partial answer to
this problem insofar as it declares the owner-lessor's insurance as primary insurance unless
clearly disclaimed, see note 122 subra, it does not address the major problem presented by
Roth: the lessor, and the lessor's insurer's rights to attempt to control their liability
by contract once the victim has been compensated by the lessor or its insurer. It is to this
problem that this analysis is directed. The answer provided by Insurance Co. of North
America v. Avis Rent-A-Car, 348 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 1977), discussed supra note 125, offers the
incongruous prediction that providing no coverage beyond minimum financial responsibility
,coverage is economically preferable (to the lessor by limiting its liability) to providing
higher limits of coverage to legitimate lessees and lessee-permittees.
The same result which can be expected under the new statutory section was effected by
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refusing to grant the lessor's insurer the right to indemnity from the negligent
operation that:
Often... permittees of rental car lessees temporarily driving rental cars
would not be as fortunate as Roth and have the protection of their own
personal auto liability insurance coverage, rendering it even more difficult for injured members of the public to 137
recover their losses arising
from the negligence of drivers of rental cars.
However, as Susco clearly held, these injured members of the public need not
rely upon the liability coverage of the permittee to recover for their injuries
since the owner-lessor and lessee-permittee and their liability insurers are joint
tortfeasors who are jointly and severally liable to the injured party. If the
liability insurer has determined that it is economically beneficial to provide
insurance to one lessor because that lessor leases only to customers with an
actuarially predictable lower accident rate, then that lessor should be able to
benefit from that preference and be able to deter the lessee from turning the
vehicle over to persons who have an actuarially greater tendency to be involved
in accidents. Indeed, to the extent that it is true that juveniles have an
actuarially greater tendency to become involved in accidents, primary accident
costs are reduced. Joint and several liability of the parties to the plaintiff will
not be affected. The injured party will still retain the right to bring to judgment any or all of the joint tortfeasors. But the lessee, permittee, and owner
need not be treated as having resolved their relative rights to allocate the losses
afforded each other after judgment once the injured party has been compensated. One premise underlying the right to indemnity is a breach of duty. As
noted, this right may be based upon the breach of a contractually stated duty.
Roth involved just such a breach. The lessee breached a duty to the lessor
when he specifically violated a term of the lease agreement that while ineffective to deprive injured third parties of the right to sue the lessor, should be
given effect for purposes of establishing the relative rights of the parties
jointly liable to the plaintiff who have so contracted, if primary loss deterrence
is the goal of the doctrine of implied indemnity. By endorsing implied indemnity the court accepted the concept of total loss shifting by one joint tortfeasor, through the expedient of implied indemnity, to another joint tortfeasor.
That is, the court has acknowledged that the basis upon which liability is imthe Third District Court in National Indem. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 345 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. 3d
D.C.A. 1977). The court in National Indem. distinguished Roth by interpreting Roth as having been based in part on the fact that the lessee had contributed toward the purchase of the

liability insurance. Id. at 1079. Equally material was the fact that the lessee in National
Indem. had contractually agreed to indemnify the lessor. Id. at 1078. To that extent, National
Indem. can be catalogued along with Allstate Ins. Co. v. Alterman Transport Lines, Inc., 465
F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1972), discussed supra note 115 as representing a situation whose resolution
turned upon the contractual assumption of the obligation to indemnify. Whether this form of
contractual indemnity agreement would have been respected by the courts when entered into
in the average lessee-lessor relationship in light of Roth is, of course, questionable. Cf.
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Coccia, Getting Others to
Assume the Loss, 77 NAT'L UND. 39 (1973).
137. 269 So. 2d at 7.
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posed upon a tortfeasor shall be considered. The basis for liability of a lessor
(or a lessor's insurance company) is of a category that would normally permit
the transference of the costs of compensation for innocent injury through the
mechanism of implied indemnity. Roth may, however, have represented the
first stage in a departure from secondary loss transference based upon fault, and
may provide the vehicle for a new analysis of fault-based liability with a more
fundamental impact than the adoption of pure comparative negligence. The
Roth decision represents one of the clearest examples of the resolution of
choices against the industry that specializes in compensating for injuries. It is
a choice that must be made, in the first instance, as Susco clearly indicates,
until the physically injured party has been compensated. The choice that has
been made in Roth, although the court has not fully articulated that bias, is
that the loss, once shifted to a preferred loss distributor, should be shifted no
more. 3 8
Although the doctrine of pure comparative negligence has been briefed,
argued, and decided as if it were grounded entirely in the fault principle, the
judicial intent has not been to make each tortfeasor's liability commensurate
with his fault, since if this were the case the court would also have abandoned
joint and several liability. Rather, the doctrine has two components: a fault
element, which is satisfied -when the claimant's damages are reduced by the
self-responsibility discount and a no-fault element, which acknowledges the
fortuity and randomness with which some damages are suffered. Thus the
doctrine of pure comparative negligence does not require that a negligent
party suffer any greater loss than a fault-computed proportionate reduction in
his total damages. 3 9
The supreme court, in Hoffman v. Jones,14° stated that the damages awarded

to each party in a comparative negligence action shall be set off against each
other. In an attempt to implement this setoff requirement, the Third District
Court of Appeal in Stuyvesant Insurance Co. v. Bournazian,'1 4 held that while
the Hoffman setoff rule permitted a party with an affirmative judgment to reduce his liability by the amount of that affirmative judgment, the liability insurance carrier of that party -was not entitled to be credited for the amount of
138. See note 131 supra. It is also important to note that the collateral sources rule which
permits an injured party to collect for the full amount of the cost of compensation for injuries received from a tortfeasor has been radically modified. The Florida Insurance and Tort

Reform Act of 1977, 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-468, §34 created FLA. STAT. §627.7372 (1977),
which provides that benefits paid by any collateral sources shall be admitted into evidence as
well as the claimant's contribution for these sources. Thus, while the claimant theoretically
will still have a claim for those injuries which have been compensated by a collateral source,
it is highly problematical whether a jury will be inclined to award the claimant a second
recovery for already compensated-for loss.
139. Pure comparative negligence does not alter the basic rationale which underlies the
fault system of loss compensation. It affects a modification of the harshness of the common
law contributory negligence rule. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
140. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
141. 303 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1974), reversed on March 10, 1976, by the Florida
supreme court in an unpublished opinion found in Walkowiak, supra note 8, app. at 121.
The March 10, 1976 supreme court opinion was later withdrawn and superceded by the court.
Stuyvesant Ins. Co. v. Bournazian, 342 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 1976).
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its insured's judgment. The insurance carrier's liability, therefore, was for the
full amount of the damages caused by their insureds. Following rehearing by
the supreme court, it affirmed the decision of the Third District Court of
Appeal. 42 Thus Bournazian interpreted the setoff principles of Hoffman as a
right possessed solely by the individual tortfeasor and as providing no benefit
to the insurers of those individuals. 143 Comparative negligence principles were
once again interpreted to shift a loss to the most efficient loss distributor.
The essential pro-compensation nature of pure comparative negligence is
apparent. It permits any party who has been causally negligent to receive compensation for his injuries, reduced only by his percentage of causal negligence
- the self-responsibility discount. Hoffman established that the party with a
larger damage verdict is entitled to set off the amount of that verdict against
any liability it may have to another party regardless of degrees of fault.
142. 842 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 1976). The tactics of trying personal injury suits are now much
more complex owing to the adoption of pure comparative negligence, proportional contribution, and set-off (recoupment), with consequent increases in the cost of litigation expected.
One illustration of this can be found in Florida Rock & Sand Co. v. Cox, 344 So. 2d 1296 (Fla.
8d D.C.A. 1977). In Cox, the driver and passenger of an automobile brought an action against
the contractor in charge of repairing a highway when the car they were in struck a median
strip. The contractor filed a third party complaint against the sub-contractor responsible for
repairing that section of the highway. The sub-contractor sought indemnity and contribution
from the driver and passenger. The trial court dismissed the sub-contractor's complaint. The
Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal of the indemnity action and affirmed
dismissal of the contribution action against the passenger. Allegations had been made that the
driver and passenger were joint venturers. As such, the negligence of one would be imputed
to the other and the recovery of both would be reduced by the percentage of negligence attributable to the negligent joint venturers under the comparative negligence doctrine. The
existence of a joint venture is a question of fact. If, therefore, the finder of fact determines
that there was no joint venture, the negligence, if any, of the driver would not be imputed
to the passenger. The driver, therefore, would have his recovery reduced by his selfTesponsibility discount and the passenger would be entitled to full compensation from a
partially negligent tortfeasor, the sub-contractor. Unless the sub-contractor could seek contribution from the driver, he would bear the total loss suffered by the passenger for which
he was only partially responsible. That is, if there is no joint venture and the sub-contractor
is found 60 percent negligent and the driver is found 40 percent negligent, then the driver's
damages will be reduced by 40 percent, his self-responsibility discount, and the passenger will
be entitled to full recovery. The court concluded, therefore, that as to the non-joint venturer
passenger's damages, the driver was a joint tortfeasor against whom a cause of action for
proportional contribution lay. If, as may be the case here, the sub-contractor is not insured
or its insurer not named in the suit, then the damages to be awarded the driver after deducting his self-responsibility discount will be set off against the driver's contribution share
owed to the sub-contractor. (If the driver's liability insurer is subsequently named in the
suit, it would not be entitled to utilize the damage judgment of its insured against the sub.
contractor claim for contribution under the rule laid down in Bournazian.) The concept that
the driver's insurance company should not be allowed to profit from the compensable loss
due to the driver's loss is lost in the name of procedural integrity to fault-based liability. It
seems apparent that in the name of good economics the costs of these types of suits will
escalate insurance premiums and raise the minimum level at which nuisance suits should be
settled.
143. While the Florida Insurance and Tort Reform Act of 1977, discussed at note 181,
supra, eliminated the liability insurer or a party defendant during the determination of liability stage, the insurer may be named for purpose of entry of judgment.
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Bournazian established that the right of this setoff inured solely to the party
and not to the party's insurer. The doctrine of pure comparative negligence as
interpreted in Bournazian implicitly acknowledges that the beneficial effects
of financial liability upon primary cost reduction are fully satisfied when the
insured's total damages have been reduced by his self-responsibility discount.
His damages need not be reduced further when he has attempted to protect
himself against further reduction through the loss distribution vehicle of
liability insurance. That is, the losses that he has caused another should be
compensated through the expedient of the professional loss distributor -the
liability insurer. The Florida Insurance and Tort Reform Act of 1977 has
taken the next step in this progression by modifying the collateral sources rule
and totally eliminating recovery of personal injury protection benefits from a
tortfeasor. Thus loss distributors providing first person benefits bear losses that
concepts of fault-based compensation dictate should be shifted.
THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL

An initial analysis of rules of compensation based upon fault forces the conclusion that many people who suffer injuries receive no compensation at all
because they have failed to prove that their injuries were caused by a breach of
duty, failed to prove causation, or failed to overcome a defense asserted by the
defendant; and that some injuries are compensated by parties whose liability
is based not upon fault, but upon operation of a rule of law when there has
been no "active" fault. The operation of the body of rules called tort law permits the participants in certain activities that may cause injury or death to
avoid tort liability for those injuries unless society has imposed a duty to maintain a certain "standard of care" and the "standard of care" which has been set
for that activity has been breached. It is not enough for a claimant to prove
that he was injured by an activity which could have been conducted more
safely. He must prove that it was undertaken in violation of the standard of
care for that activity. Certain activities can be conducted in a manner that
cause injury but do not require imposition of liability for injuries because the
benefits to society in convenience outweigh our societal desire to prevent the
injuries. 4 4 Thus, although the use of a private automobile at speeds of up to
fifty-five m.p.h. greatly increases the risk and seriousness of injury when accidents occur at that speed, and the risk and seriousness of injuries could be
eliminated if the speed at which private vehicles operated was reduced to
twenty m.p.h., no liability is imposed upon persons driving at a speed of fiftyfive m.p.h. in the absence of some further violation of a standard of care.
The civilly-proscribed conduct is not defined as traveling at the speed of
fifty-five m.p.h. in the absence of additional circumstances, and therefore no
loss shifting will occur. The injured party is made to bear the total burden of
his losses without recourse to the injury producer's enterprise. The underlying
basis for fault as a liability shifting mechanism is that certain conduct undertaken by a person involved in an enterprise should be proscribed because this
144. See Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Non-Fault Allocation of
Costs, 78 HARv. L. REV. 713, 716-21 (1965).
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conduct is responsible for causing injuries in excess of acceptable limits. The
conduct is deterred by imposing liability for injuries that result from that conduct. This theory requires that the proscribed conduct be capable of definition
separately from involvement in the enterprise. 145 To the extent that injuries
are caused by individuals who participate in an enterprise, these injuries are a
cost of that enterprise. The resulting injuries that remain uncompensated by
the parties participating in the enterprise because of a societal decision that
they need not be compensated then serve to subsidize that enterprise.
All injury-producing enterprises are subsidized to a degree under the fault

system in that some injuries which result from their operations are uncompensated. Under traditional negligence doctrine the costs of compensating for
injuries caused by conducting an enterprise are not conclusive of the question
of whether the participants of that enterprise will be required to compensate
46
for those injuries.

If an active (or primary) tortfeasor or his insurer is released from all
liability through payments made by a secondary (or passive) tortfeasor or his
insurer then the proscribed conduct will not have been deterred through administration of civil liability for tortious acts. 4 The secondary-passive tortfeasor is entitled to indemnity because his liability is based upon technical application of law favoring victim compensation. It becomes apparent that no

specific, proscribable conduct committed by the secondary-passive tortfeasor has
been identified, except that the enterprise in which he is involved has caused
injury. The liability of the secondary-passive tortfeasor is based solely upon the
decision that the need to insure compensation to injured parties is paramount
and is, in fact, enterprise liability. Ownership of a defective crane, 148 liability

to an invitee for the torts of another, 149 liability of the owner of a motor vehicle
for the negligence of the operator, 150 or liability of an employer for the negli-

gence of his employee' 5 ' do not involve identifiable culpable conduct on the
145. The analysis of this form of loss transference under which the doctrine of implied
indemnity operates is not intended to, by implication, convey approval.
146. Although certain types of enterprises are held to a higher standard of care than
negligence, this has not always been the result of the actual increased number of injuries, but
rather, the increased likelihood of some injuries.
147. As discussed earlier, in the text accompanying note 43 supra, the theoretical basis
for the right to contribution is inconsistent with the right to indemnity. Although a pro rata
distribution of the costs of compensating for losses might compensate for this inconsistency,
the present proportional contribution system would seem to preclude any realistic contribution between a "passive" and "active" tortfeasor. The "fault" of the "active" tortfeasor
through whom the "passive" tortfeasor was being held liable must in most instances be so far
in excess of the "fault" of the passive tortfeasor as to constitute "total fault." This same difficulty would seem to exist in an action based upon strict liability; however, the Florida
supreme court, in West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976) engrafted
Hoffman's comparison of fault principles onto the strict liability action. See also Butaud v.
Suburban Marine &Sporting Goods, 555 P.2d 42 (Alas. 1976).
148. Mim's Crane Service, Inc. v. Insley Mfg. Corp., 226 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1969).
149. Grand Union Co. v. Prudential Bldg. Maint. Corp., 226 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 3d D.C.A.
1969); Olin's Rent-A-Car System, Inc. v. Royal Continental Hotels, Inc., 187 So. 2d 349 (Fla.
4th D.C.A. 1966).
150. Hutchins v. Frank E. Campbell, Inc., 123 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1960).
151. See Maybarduk v. Bustamante, 294 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1974); Grand Union

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1978

41

Florida
Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [1978], Art. 1
OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

UNIVERSITY

[Vol. XXX

part of the secondary or passive tortfeasor. Any denial of the right to indemnity
from the active-primary tortfeasor or his insurer results in a second level of
subsidy to the active-primary tortfeasor's enterprise in addition to the subsidy
limiting its liability to "fault" caused injuries. This second subsidy is made
more incongruous by the statutory right of the insurer of an "active" tortfeasor
to seek contribution and is justified only when the economics of first person
loss distribution vehicles are acknowledged.
CONCLUSION

While the adoption of pure comparative negligence augurs well for continued rethinking of the bases of loss distribution for tort injuries, it is essentially an attempt to breathe new life into fault based loss transference. So
long as loss transference is contingent upon establishing fault, the unnecessary
subsidization of injury producing enterprises will occur. Uncompensated victims will finance an enterprise while ever more complex vehicles for transferring the little compensation that is awarded are fashioned. This loss transference will be effected while attempting to pay homage to the twin goals of
fault-based loss allocation. The doctrine of implied indemnity, while a product
of the fault-based liability system, affords a vehicle for establishing loss transference based upon enterprise participation regardless of "fault," but at present
it functions primarily as a vehicle for loss transference from enterprise liability
to fault-based liability.
The doctrine and the cases interpreting its application, however, have continually forced the courts to re-analyze the system of tort loss distribution which
follows the initial decision to compensate the injured party. That this may
force a realistic appraisal of the role and effect of pure loss distribution regardless of fault reflects well upon the common law system of adjustment of interpersonal rights and offers prediction of a loss distribution system that is both
efficient and just.
Corp. v. Prudential, 226 So. 2d 117 (Fla. d D.C.A. 1969). The right to indemnity would flow
from the actively negligent tortfeasor-employee to the employer and not between an employer
vicariously liable for the negligence of his employee and a non-employee tortfeasor. See Dura
Corp. v. Wallace, 297 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1974), discussed at note 78 supra.
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